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The purpose of this thesis is to characterize the Soviet concept of ballistic
missile defense (BMD) in order to better understand and predict future Soviet
BMD decision making. The Soviet concept of BMD is fundamentally different
from that in the West. Soviet BMD is clearly an integral component of a much
larger Soviet strategic defense effort which consists of strategic air defense as well
as passive measures, such as mobility, deep underground command and control
facilities and civil defense. As the Soviet military literature demonstrates, Soviet
strategic air defense encompasses defense against a continuum of threats — from
aircraft to ballistic missiles to satellites to "space-strike weapons." Soviet strategic
air defense weapons therefore appear optimized to counter a wide range of
airborne threats. In the Soviet view, surface-to-air missiles may be a primary'
tactical BMD weapon. Additionally, Soviet strategic BMD weapons may be a
primary Soviet anti-satellite weapon. Furthermore, manned space platforms play a






II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 6
A. THE EARLY YEARS OF SOVIET BMD 6
B. SOVIET BMD AND THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 10
C SOVIET BMD SINCE THE ABM TREATY J4
III. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT 21
A
.
THE ROLE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRLNE AND STRATEGY 21
B. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, NUCLEAR WAR AND STRATEGIC
DEFENSE OF THE U.S.S.R 24
C. BMD AND THE DIALECTIC OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 32
D. BMD AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN NTJCLEAR WAR 36
IV. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: SYSTEMS
ANT) OPERATIONS 43
A. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE 44
B. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BMD ANT) ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
.47
C. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BMD AND ANTISPACE DEFENSE 58
V. THE OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 70
A. SOVIET BMD AND ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES 70
B. SOVIET BMD AND THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE 74







I would like to thank my advisor. Dr. David Yost, for giving so generously of
his time and energy in the creation of this thesis. From start to finish, his guidance
was invaluable. I would also like to thank Dr. Jim Taylor for giving me many
insights into the closed world of the Soviet mihtary.
Most of all, I want to thank my wife, Sharon, without whose love and support
this thesis would not have been possible.

I. INTRODUCTION
Anti-missile defense can do almost nothing for a country subject to a
nuclear surprise attack; it most suits an attacking country trying to reduce the
strength of a retaliator>' strike.
— Gennady Gerasimov, Soviet Foreign Ministry
spokesman, July 1983 [Ref. l:p. 7]
The Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) program has "tremendous
power.. .in affecting perceptions of the strategic balance between the United States
and the Soviet Union." [Ref. 2:p. 182] This "tremendous power" stems in large
measure from the significant asymmetries that have developed over the last twenty
years in U.S. and Soviet defenses against ballistic missile attack. During most of
this time the United States has perceived BMD to be destabilizing, believing that
mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack would effectively deter nuclear war and thus
ser\'e as a basis for international strategic stability. After signing the ABM Treaty
in 1972, the U.S. pursued this vision by unilaterally rejecting deployment of nearly
all defenses against ballistic missile attack, except for the few months in 1975-1976
that the Grand Forks Safeguard ABM site was operational.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has taken a considerably different
approach. The Soviet leadership seems to have never accepted the peculiarly
American logic of "mutual assured destruction" or, as they prefer to call it, the
"balance of terror". Instead, mutual deterrence has been considered inherently
unstable and undesirable because it suggests both a Soviet acceptance of the
international political status quo and a Soviet denial of the peacetime poUtical utility
of the U.S.S.R.'s military power [Ref. 3:p. 13]. Since the end of World War II the
Soviets have, in fact, been embarked on a steady, incremental BMD program which
now includes a nationwide infrastructure of early warning sensors and C^ facilities,
the world's only deployed BMD system around Moscow, a series of surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) with a potential capability against ballistic missiles, a formidable
technology base for developing advanced BMD weapons, and launch capabilities
for deploying such advanced military systems in space.
The continuing buildup of Soviet ballistic missile defenses could, if left
unchecked, undermine the credibility and probable operational effectiveness of
U.S. strategic retaliatory capabilities-especially at a time when the U.S. is pursuing
a more technically demanding and operationally discriminate deterrent strategy
which emphasizes selective counterforce targeting and escalation control. With a
monopoly on effective defenses against ballistic missile attack, the Soviets "might
come to believe that they could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or
our allies without fear of effective retaliation-at the very least, they might see a
realistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail." [Ref. 4:p. 51]
Soviet BMD is an integral part of the overall Soviet strategic defense effort.
Along with antiaircraft and anti-satellite weapons, hardened ICBM silos and C^
facilities, mobile ICBMs and a comprehensive system of deep underground
leadership command facilities and related civil defense preparations, BMD
contributes to the overall Soviet ability to fight and survive a nuclear war. It is the
purpose of this thesis to characterize the Soviet concept of BMD in order to better
understand and predict future Soviet BMD decision making. In order to do so, this
thesis attempts to develop the conceptual basis of Soviet BMD, primarily through
an analysis of open-source Soviet military writings. The unclassified Soviet
military literature is the product of a centrally controlled Soviet system of military
research that produces and disseminates official Soviet definitions, terminology and
views on nearly all aspects of Soviet military affairs. It was decided during the
course of this research to use only unclassified sources, both Soviet and Western, in
order to focus not on Soviet hardware, but instead on Soviet concepts of operations
for their BMD forces, the military potential of BMD as defined by Soviet military
science, and the role which BMD plays in Soviet warfighting strategy.
Due to the secretiveness of the Soviet system and Soviet desires to shape
Western perceptions of their military capabilities, it is recognized that any analysis
based on of>en Soviet literature is subject to distortions and omissions. Soviet
"maskirovka" has done much in the past to conceal the true nature of Soviet
military systems and operations from the West. Accordingly, the conclusions
reached in this thesis should be weighed against data obtained through classified
intelligence methods. Nevertheless, the analysis of open source Soviet military
literature can yield crucial insights regarding the rationale for Soviet behavior
which may not be obtainable through current technical means of intelligence
collection.
In general, the Soviet concept of BMD is not the same as the Western concept, a
distinction that will be fully developed in a later chapter. Soviet BMD clearly exists
within the larger context of Soviet national air defense, which encompasses defense
against all enemy air threats. Although reference is made to both U.S. and Soviet
"BMD" throughout this thesis, the reader should bear in mind that Soviet thinking
on defense against ballistic missile attack is fundamentally different from that in the
Western alliance.
The Soviet concept of BMD as expressed in the oj>en Soviet literature has
unfortunately received inadequate attention in the West. This lack of attention has
often resulted in significant misunderstandings and miscalculations of Soviet
intentions and goals, especially in arms control negotiations. It may, for example,
be argued that conclusion of the 1972 ABM Treaty represented no basic change in
Soviet ideas about the ultimate desirability of BMD. In August 1983 the Soviet
Union submitted to the United Nations a draft "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use
of Force in Outer Space and from Outer Space against the Earth," which seeks to
prohibit space-based weapons for antimissile, anti-satellite and surface strike
missions [Ref 5:pp. 53-55]. Space-based weapons could, of course, play a
significant role in future U.S. BMD system architectures and further restrictions on
their development and potential deployment would greatly circumscribe the future
of U.S. BMD. Would such restrictions, therefore, not equally limit the prospects
for Soviet BMD? In order to better understand Soviet arms control goals in cases
such as this, insights into Soviet thinking on BMD are very much needed.
This thesis is concerned primarily with the warfighting role of BMD in Soviet
military strategy, although this warfighting role will be set within the context of
overall Soviet political-military goals-including the Soviet interest in bringing
about political change without armed conflict. Specifically, it will attempt to help
answer the following questions:
(1) What is the Soviet concept of BMD? What is the role of BMD in Soviet
military strategy? To what end is the vigorous Soviet BMD program
directed?
(2) Why has the Soviet Union so persistently pursued BMD in the face of the
relatively severe limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty? What is the
potential for Soviet "breakout or "creepout" from their ABM Treaty
obligations? What effect might the deployment of U.S. BMD systems have on
the Soviet program?
(3) Where is the Soviet BMD program headed? What role will new
technological developments play m the future of Soviet BMD? What role will
space and space weapons platforms play?
Chapter II will provide a background for discussion by providing an overview
of the Soviet BMD program, identifying major trends in the development of
systems and operations. Chapter III will then build on this historical framework by
establishing the conceptual context of Soviet military doctrine in which Soviet
BMD programs are generated. It will discuss the importance of national air
defense in Soviet military doctrine, Soviet concepts of damage limitation, the
relationship of offense and defense in Soviet military strategy, the probable
wartime role of BMD, and the potential effect of BMD on the correlation of forces
in a nuclear war as perceived by the Soviets.
Chapter IV will attempt to characterize the Soviet concept of BMD. It will
discuss the larger Soviet concept of national air defense and outline Soviet views on
the organization of BMD "forces and means" as well as the relationship of BMD to
antiaircraft defense and antispace defense. Chapter V will then discuss possible
future courses of development for Soviet BMD based on the Soviet concept of the
role and utility of BMD. The potential for ABM Treaty "breakout" or "creepout"
will be addressed, together with the issue of anti-tactical ballistic missile weapons
(ATBMs) and the possible role of space in the future of Soviet BMD. Finally,
Chapter \T will offer some general conclusions.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE
A. THE EARLY YEARS OF SOVIET BMD
The Soviet BMD program can trace its beginnings to the years shortly after
World War II. German air raids on Moscow and Leningrad during the war along
with the post-war U.S. strategic bomber threat undoubtedly helped to make defense
against air attack a high military priority in the Soviet Union. In 1948 the National
Air Defense forces became an independent military service, organizationally the
equal of the Ground Forces, Navy and Air Force. Around the same time a massive
buildup of jet fighters, early warning radars and anti-aircraft artillery began. In
1952 the first surface-to-air missile, the SA-1, was introduced.
According to Sayre Stevens, "work on an actual BMD program evidently
began in the late 1940s or early 1950s." [Ref. 2:p. 191] Nikita Khrushchev once
stated that work on ICBMs and ABMs began simultaneously [Ref. 6]. During these
early years, however, Soviet commentary on the possiblilities of effective BMD
was decidedly pessimistic. Michael Deane quotes one Soviet author who wrote in
the late 1950s that "the most effective defense against such long-range rockets is by
means of their destruction in the storage places, in the process of transport, and on
the launching platforms where the preparations for each firing takes a rather long
time." [Ref. 3 :p. 25]
The first actual evidence of Soviet work on ballistic missile defenses was
obtained by U-2 photo-reconnaissance flights over the Sary Shagan missile test
facility in Soviet Central Asia. One flight in 1958 detected the presence of
"primitive ABM radars" [Ref. 7:p. 152] while another in April 1960 revealed
evidence of a "major program" underway which included the Hen House ballistic
missile early warning radars, the soon-to-be-deployed Griffon system and the
beginnings of the Moscow Galosh system [Ref. 2:p. 191].
Secluded deep in Kazakhstan, Sar>' Shagan proved to be ideally located as a
BMD test facility. Because testing there could be conducted below the radio
horizon of peripheral Western intelligence collection sites, it was difficult to
monitor and thus assess Soviet BMD developments [Ref. 2:p. 196]. For this reason,
the April 1960 flight was significant not only for the intelligence it obtained, but
also for its good fonune, since it was the last operational U-2 mission prior to the
May 1960 shootdown of Gar>' Powers [Ref. 2:p. 191]. Sary Shagan is also located
about a thousand miles downrange from the ballistic missile test center at Kapustin
Yar. In late 1961 the Soviet Union conducted a series of atmospheric nuclear tests,
during which missiles were launched from Kapustin Yar towards an impact area at
Sary Shagan. These tests provided an opportunity for operationally testing BMD
radars and components as well as collecting engineering data on the effects of
atmospheric blast and EMP. This emphasis on realistic, operational testing of their
BMD system differed markedly from the U.S. approach of "gathering data in the
hope that a wide range of specific operational conditions could then be derived
from more basic data." [Ref. 2:p. 195]
The first operational deployment of a missile system attributed a possible BMD
role was begun around Leningrad in 1962. The Griffon, which had previously
been seen at Sary Shagan, was a two-stage endoatmospheric missile with a
maximum slant range of about 100 miles [Ref. 3:p. 27]. Its deployment around
Leningrad provided coverage of the city itself as well as the major ingress flight
routes for missiles launched against the western U.S.S.R. from the United States.
Analysts continue to debate whether the Griffon was a BMD interceptor or merely
a high altitude SAM designed to counter U.S. strategic bombers - or, in fact, a
system designed to partially fulfill both missions. Relatively unsophisticated as a
BMD system due to its limited data processing capability and missile performance,
the Griffon seems nevertheless to have been praised as having resolved "the
problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight." [Ref. 8:p. 27]
Although the program was halted shortly after deployment, the Griffon was a
significant step for Soviet BMD efforts for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the
Soviet method of deploying systems "as soon as possible, even if rudimentar)' and
imperfect, so that a basis for developing more effective systems - through
incremental improvements - might be established." [Ref. 9:p. 39] This strategy of
deliberately fielding marginally effective systems, while concurrently developing
upgrades and follow-ons, has allowed the Soviets to maintain an operational BMD
system capable of performing at least some mission requirements since the early
1960s. In contrast, U.S. BMD efforts have historically been subject to ver}'
demanding measures of effectiveness which have helped to prevent the sustained
deployment of any system whatsoever.
Second, the Griffon represents a distinct line of systems development for
Soviet BMD hardware - that is, the improvement of air defense weapons to deal
with the ballistic missile threat. According to Sayre Stevens, "[a]ll of the systems
produced by this approach have a strong air-defense look and seem to seek an
antiballistic missile capability through the strengthening of a basic anti-aircraft
approach." [Ref. 2:p. 195] Surface-to-air missiles that are today assessed as having
a possible BMD role (especially an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) role), such
as the SA-10 and SA-12, can in part trace their roots to the Leningrad Griffon.
This development line seems to have proceeded quite independently of the Moscow
BMD system, which emphasized large, radar-heavy installations with long-range,
primarily exoatmospheric weapons.
The Moscov^ BMD system represents the second major development line for
Soviet BMD systems. Although construction began around Moscow in October
1962, the system did not become operational until at least 1967 or early 1968 [Ref.
10:pp. 87-88]. Once operational the system consisted of: Hen House and Dog
House radars for early warning and battle management; four launch complexes,
radially located about fifty miles from the center of the city and equipped with the
nuclear-armed Galosh missile; and other associated target tracking and missile
guidance radars.
The Hen House radar network initially consisted of two of these large early
warning radars, one located at Irkutsk, along the Barents coast, and the other in the
Baltic republic of Latvia [Ref. 7:p. 158]. The Hen House system was supplemented
by a large phased array radar in the Moscow area which came to be known as the
Dog House radar. The Dog House was capable of providing target tracking and
target acquisition information to the tracking and missile guidance radars located at
the launch complexes.
Each of the four launch complexes housed two missile emplacements consisting
of one large target tracking radar, two smaller missile guidance radars and eight
above-ground launchers for the Galosh missile. The Galosh missile itself was
publicly unveiled in the November 1964 parade. It was a long-range,
exoatmospheric interceptor equipped with a nuclear warhead. Its range was at one
point announced to be "hundreds of miles." [Ref. 10:p. 89] At this range, the
Galosh could theoretically provide an area defense for much of the western Soviet
Union.
While the Moscow BMD system of the late 1960s might have proved somewhat
effective in combatting a French, British or Chinese missile attack, it was quite
limited in its ability to deal with a concerted American attack. The Hen House
radar, operating at VHF frequencies, was extremely vulnerable to the effects of
EMP and radar blackout, which could be caused by a precursor detonation from an
attacking force or could be self-inflicted by the detonation of a defending Galosh
warhead. Also, the early warning and target tracking radars themselves were
extremely soft targets and any leakage at all of attacking missiles could have quickly
eliminated critical components of the system. Another major weakness of the
Moscow system was its limited data processing capability. This limitation meant
that an attacker could saturate the system by offering more targets than the
computers could simultaneously process. With the U.S. deployment of MIRVed
ICBMs and SLBMs just on the horizon, the ability of missiles to penetrate the
defenses by saturation appeared certain. Other significant drawbacks of the
Moscow BMD system included its gaps in radar coverage along some attack
corridors and its susceptibility to electronic countermeasures, such as chaff and
decoys. Perhaps because of these limitations, work on the Moscow system was
halted in 1968 with only four of the eight originally planned launch complexes
completed.
B. SOVIET BMD AND THE ABM TREATY OF 1972
In view of the important role that BMD plays in Soviet war-fighting strategies
along with the steady construction of a Soviet BMD capability just described, one
might wonder why the Soviet Union was so eager to limit its BMD system by
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signing the ABM Treaty with the United States. Prior to 1967 the Soviets had
shown little enthusiasm for placing any limitation whatsoever on defensive
weapons, yet by the time of the first SALT I session in Helsinki in November 1969,
it was the Soviet negotiators who were pushing hard for constraints on BMD
development. WTiat factors brought about this shift in Soviet policy?
It seems clear that by the late 1960s a major reappraisal of the role of ballistic
missile defense in general was taking place in the Soviet Union. Claims that Soviet
interceptors could "hit a fly in outer space" [Ref. 11] gave way to more realistic
assessments of BMD effectiveness. These new assessments appeared in an almost
open debate in the Soviet press between senior Air Defense (Voyska
Protivovozdushnoy Oborony, or V-PVO) officers and military officers of other
services. While the V-PVO leadership continued to uphold the need for BMD and
to trumpet the merits of the Moscow system, other Soviet leaders, including
Defense Mininster Malinovsky, stressed the imperfectibility of BMD. In fact, these
disagreements may have led to the dismissal of Marshal Sudets as V-PVO CINC in
1966.^ Of perhaps telling significance, for the first time since 1963 the carefully
orchestrated November 7th military parade in 1968 did not include media
reference to BMD weapons. During this time too the Soviet leadership first
announced its willingness to discuss limitations on defensive strategic weapons.
This decision to discuss limitations on its cherished BMD system was clearly a
difficult one for the Soviet leadership. Reasons that have been put forth for this
decision include: the ineffectiveness of the Moscow system against the new U.S.
MIRV threat; the high cost of deploying large phased array radars and nationwide
For funher discussion of this "debate" see Ref 12: pp. 298-300
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launch installations; West Germany's acceptance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and, therefore, the removal of the potential German IRBM threat; and a
sudden, new found Soviet desire to curb strategic defenses in the interest of U.S.-
Soviet stability .2 These factors may in fact have all played some role in the
decision. What to many analysts, however, seems to have been of overriding
concern to the Soviet decision makers was a desire to place limits on the deployment
of a more sophisticated U.S. BMD system in order to maintain their ability to carry
out damage-limiting preemptive strikes.
It has been estimated that at the time of the ABM Treaty the U.S. enjoyed
roughly a ten year lead over the Soviet Union in BMD technology [Ref. 2:p. 204].
Despite Soviet introduction of their own MIRVed ICBMs, deployment of a vastly
superior U.S. BMD system, such as Safeguard, would have "threaten[ed] the Soviet
Union's capability to acquire the preemptive counterforce capability that was the
key to their damage-limitation doctrine and the element of that doctrine that
seemed most achievable in the near term." [Ref. 2:p. 204] Faced with the
tremendous cost of deploying a nationwide BMD system and realizing that when
deployed this system would be technologically inferior to any U.S. system, the
Soviets may have reasoned that a negotiated hmit on BMD deployments was the
most expedient decision for the forseeable future.
Political negotiation and detente have historically been effective Soviet
strategies for preventing the West from capitalizing on its technological
superiority. Not only does it undermine the West's will to compete in military
affairs, but it also facilitates the Soviet acquisition of Western technology
2 For further discussion of this last factor, see Ref. 12
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[Ref. 13:p. 27] Current Soviet initiatives to negotiate limits on weaponry in areas
of relative Soviet inferiority, such as space weaponry, can be seen as part of a
Soviet "long-term political strategy of detente and negotiation designed to preclude
full realization by Western powers of their potential advantage in militar>'-
technical competition." [Ref. 13:p. 27]
The ABM Treaty, signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev
in Moscow on May 26, 1972, placed severe constraints on both Soviet and
American BMD programs. Among other provisions, the treaty (as amended by the
1974 protocol):
(1) Restricts BMD deployments to only one BMD site per side, deployed either
in the national capital'area or in an area containing ICBM silos at least 1300
km from the national capital.
(2) Sets a limit of 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles at each site.
(3) Restricts the deployment of large phased array radars to BMD sites, BMD
test ranges and areas along the periphery of the country, from which they
must be oriented outward.
(4) Prohibits sea-based, air-based, space-based and land mobile BMD systems
and components.
(5) Prohibits "rapid reload" BMD launchers.
(6) Includes an agreement that "in the event ABM systems based on other
physical principles and including components capable of substituting for
ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created m the
future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be
subject to discussion. "3
^ Since October 1985, the U.S. has recognized "restrictive" and "broad"
interpretations of the ABM Treaty. Under the more restrictive interpretation,
development and testing of BMD systems based on "other physical principles" is
allowed only for fixed land-based systems. The broader interpretation of the treaty
allows such development and testing (but not deployment) regardless of basing
mode. According to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, "the President
has reserved the right to restructure the SDI Program to take full advantage of the
broader bounds of the ABM Treaty." [Ref. 14: p. D-1, D-2]
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(7) Prohibits the testing of surface-to-air missiles and other non-BMD launchers
"in an ABM mode."
(8) Prohibits the transfer of HMD systems or components to third parties.
Meanwhile, the treaty does allow the modernization of existing BMD systems and
components as well as a certain level of research and development in BMD
technologies.
Since the signing of the ABM Treaty, American and Soviet BMD programs
have diverged sharply. Funding for U.S. BMD declined dramatically in the years
following the signing of the treaty, from $772 million in 1973 to $197 million in
1976 [Ref. 15:p. 344], while the Safeguard BMD site at Grand Forks, North
Dakota, the one U.S. site permitted by the treaty, was deactivated in 1976. In
contrast, the Soviet Union has maintained and modernized its Moscow BMD system
and has continued an aggressive research program in advanced weapons
technologies. As Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko emphasized to the Soviet
Presidium in 1972, the ABM Treaty "does not place any limitations on carrying out
research and experimental work directed towards solving the problems of defense
of the country against nuclear missile attack." [Ref. 16] This divergence in
approach to BMD has at present brought about a serious asymmetry in U.S. and
Soviet strategic defense postures. In the following section the Soviet approach will
be examined in detail.
C. SOVIET BMD SINCE THE ABM TREATY
The Soviet BMD system of today must be seen in the larger context of a
dynamic, national strategic defense effort. The Soviet BMD system along with
upgraded air defense weapons, including new and more capable fighters and SAMs,
and refined orbital antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, increases the ability of Soviet
14
national air defense to parr>' an enemy's strategic attack. New mobile ICBMs, such
as the road-mobile SS-25 and rail-mobile SS-X-24, and the Typhoon SSBN add
significantly to the survivability of Soviet strategic weapons. Passive defenses, such
as civil defense, a comprehensive system of hardened ICBM silos and deep
underground leadership command facilities, industrial and population dispersion
capabilities, and the Soviet penchant for strategic deception, all contribute to an
ability to survive and recover from a nuclear attack.
As part of this nationwide strategic defense effort the Soviet BMD system has,
within the general restrictions of the ABM Treaty, continued to grow and be
modernized. So\ iet BMD during the 1970s can perhaps best be characterized as
follows:
The level of activities at Sary Shagan continued much the same as before the
treaty was signed. . ..The Soviet Union made no moves in the 1970s to
[improve the Moscow BMD system], however, despite a decision to maintain
the current system. Neither did it make any effort to increase the number of
interceptors associated with the system up to the limit of 100 allowed by
treaty provisions. Work on the peripheral network of early warning and
acquisition radars continued. Slowly but surely the Soviet Union continued
to fill existing gaps in the coverage it provided. In general, this activity had a
flavor of stead\ , unfrenzied progress toward defined development goals.
[Ref. 2:p.211]
'
While the Soviet leadership, in signing the treaty, accepted certain restrictions
on actual BMD deployments, they seem in no way to have given up their long term
goal of "creating an invincible system for the defense of the entire country." [Ref.
17:p. 297] In fact, steady, unhurried Soviet research and development efforts in the
1970s and 1980s have in large measure closed the technology gap with the United
15
States in certain key technologies and laid the groundwork for a potential
nationwide system of ground-based BMD interceptors. "*
The most visible fruits of these Soviet efforts are their greatly expanded sensor
systems for detecting ballistic missile launches. The current network of launch
detection satellites and over-the-horizon radars can provide up to 30 minutes of
early warning on U.S. missile launches [Ref. 19:p. 47]. The Hen House early
warning radar network now consists of 1 1 radars at six sites along the Soviet
periphery. In accordance with their practice of deploying systems of somewhat
hmited capabilities and then upgrading them in the field, the Soviets have steadily
improved the capabilities of this radar since its initial deployment. The Hen House
system is now augmented by a new system of long-range, phased array radars
(LPARs) programmed for deployment at nine sites throughout the Soviet Union.
Among these new LPARs is the radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, which, because of
its location and orientation, the U.S. government maintains is in direct violation of
the provisions of the ABM Treaty [Ref. 20:p. 12].
This growing early warning system can provide target acquisition and target
tracking services to both the fixed Moscow BMD system and also, perhaps more
significantly, to the increasing number of potentially BMD-capable SAMs, such as
the SA-5, SA-10 and SA-12. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that early
warning sensor data are being integrated and internetted in the Soviet air
surveillance network for dissemination to SAM sites throughout the country [Ref.
19:p. 60].
"^ As early as 1978, the U.S. Secretary of Defense concluded that "the lead
enjoyed by the United States in BMD at the time we entered into the ABM Treaty
has greatly diminished." [Ref. 18:p. 124]
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The Moscow BMD system too has been steadily upgraded since the 1972
accords. While Soviet BMD, in general, is not focused solely on the Moscow area,
the most visible Soviet BMD efforts have included a particular emphasis on
protecting the national capital. Many analysts ascribe this preference for the
protection of Moscow to a peculiar Russian preoccupation with the cultural and
historical center of the motheriand. A more practical consideration for the
preferential defense of Moscow is the need to ensure Soviet NCA survivabilit}'.
The Moscow BMD system along with the use of hardened underground command
facilities in the Moscow area would greatly increase the survivability of key Party
and militar)' personnel in the event of war. As Stephen Meyer notes, "if there is a
Soviet plan for NCA succession under surprise attack conditions, its
implementation may depend on someone in Moscow surviving." [Ref. 21 :p. 486]
Additionally, the Moscow BMD system would raise the level of nuclear attack
required to "decapitate" the Soviet leadership, dilute the effects of a British, French
or Chinese attack and provide some insurance against an accidental nuclear launch.
Finally, of course, and quite propitiously, deployment and upgrading of the
Moscow BMD site is in accordance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.
From the original, somewhat limited Galosh exoatmospheric system, the
Moscow system is now growing into a full, two-layer defense system, composed of
new battle management radars, improved Galosh exoatmospheric interceptors and
new Gazelle endoatmospheric interceptors. This new Moscow system will for the
first time bring the number of Soviet BMD launchers up to the treaty-limited 100
launchers and could be fully operational in the late 1980s [Ref. 19:p. 47].
A major element of the new Moscow system is the Pushkino radar, also known
as the Pill Box. This radar is a large pyramid-shaped structure containing phased
17
arrays on each of its four faces which provides 360 degree coverage of
approaching ballistic missiles. The Pill Box will probably perform target tracking
and missile guidance services for the improved, silo-based Galosh and the new
Gazelle interceptors. The Gazelle is a silo-based, high acceleration missile which
now provides the Soviet Union with an ability to employ atmospheric sorting in
discriminating decoys from reentry vehicles.
The designation ABM-X-3 has been applied to a new Soviet HMD system,
including the new Flat Twin phased array radar and the silo-based Galosh and
Gazelle interceptors. Because of the transportable nature of each of these
components, the ABM-X-3 is seen as a rapidly deployable BMD system, possibly
capable of deployment throughout the Soviet Union within several months. If the
Soviets so choose at some later date, the ABM-X-3 gives them the capability to
rapidly deploy a BMD system of generally limited effectiveness for nationwide
defense but of significantly greater effectiveness for preferential defense of
specific, critical leadership or militar>' targets [Ref. 2:p. 214].
The improvements made in the Moscow system represent a continuation of the
development line of large, relatively fixed BMD systems. In addition to upgrading
the Moscow system, the Soviets have continued their efforts to improve air defense
weapons for the BMD role. The new SA-10 and SA-12 SAMs incorporate many
features considered necessary for short-range defense against ballistic missiles,
such as automated launch commitment capabilities. The U.S. Department of
Defense has concluded that the SA-10 and SA-X-12B/GIANT systems are capable
of intercepting aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles and "may have
the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles." [Ref. 19:p. 50]
The continued development and fielding of these SAM systems provides the Soviet
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military with an in situ force potentially capable of performing a BMD role.
According to Sa\Te Stevens, "the Soviet Union could have, with its new SAMs, a
BMD capability able to enhance damage limitation that is not controlled by the
ABM Treaty." The development of these strategic SAMs "constitute[s] the most
disturbing change in the balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic defenses." [Ref. 2:pp.
214-216]
The Soviets are also carrying forward an aggressive research program in
advanced technologies having direct application to BMD, including directed energy
and kinetic energy weapons. In directed energy technology, the Soviets are
exploring gas dynamic, electric discharge and chemical lasers, free electron lasers,
neutral particle beams and radio frequency weapons. They have also demonstrated
an experimental kinetic accelerator capable of accelerating small particles to
velocities approaching 25 kilometers per second within the atmosphere and 60
kilometers per second in a vacuum. In the event of the ABM Treaty's demise, these
technologies could form the basis for the next generation of Soviet BMD weapons
and. according to the U.S. Defense Department, could begin to be deployed as
protot>pe weapons before the end of the century. [Ref. 19:pp. 50-51]
Since the ABM Treaty imposes restrictions of "unlimited duration" on weapons
deployments, this broad-based Soviet BMD program, in both "conventional" and
"exotic" weapons, has ominous implications. Why would the Soviet Union invest
so steadily and heavily in a weapons system which may never see battle? Different
explanations have been offered for Soviet decision-making. Some analysts see
Soviet "arms race" reactions to Western force postures as the primary reason for
their BMD program, while others see the program as one resulting from powerful
interest groups in the Soviet military bureaucracy who have given momentum to
19
an ill-conceived program. David Yost has offered an alternate explanation
emphasizing "mission requirements" in Soviet force planning which "suggest[s] a
higher degree of deliberate and central control over Soviet military investments."
According to this interpretation, "Soviet behavior regarding BMD may be
explained as an attempt to fulfill the demands of Soviet militarv doctrine within
technological and political constraints - both external and internal." [Ref. 9:pp. 113
and 145 (emphasis added)]
To more fully appreciate Soviet BMD programs, therefore, it is crucial to
understand Soviet military doctrine. To the Soviet leadership, political-military
theory provides a framework for structuring their armed forces and planning the
conduct of war. It is, as Lenin said, the "guide to action." Furthermore, Soviet
military doctrine has long been recognized as an accurate indicator of trends in the
force structure of the Soviet military. The role of BMD in Soviet military doctrine
is the subject of the following chapter.
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III. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN SOVIET MILITARY
THOUGHT
A. THE ROLE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND
STRATEGY
As a first step in understanding the Soviet concept of BMD, it is important to
understand the structure of Soviet military thought in which the concept of BMD is
develop)ed. Soviet authors are ver>' precise in their use of terms such as doctrine
and strategy, and these terms have much more specific meanings in the Soviet
Union than in the West. Soviet military theorists have constructed an extensive
conceptual framework for understanding military affairs (see Figure 3.1) within
which they argue that military science can not only provide the means to solve
problems of military affairs, but can also predict the course of their future
development [Ref. 23:p. 5].
Soviet military doctrine represents the official policy of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on war. Military doctrine is "a system of views
adopted by a given state at a given time on the goals and nature of a possible future
war and the preparation of the armed forces and the country for it, and also the
methods of waging it." [Ref. 24:p. 371 Military doctrine is tasked with answering
the following basic questions:
(1) What is the degree of probability of a future war, and with what enemy will
one have to deal?
(2) What character might the war take which the country and its armed forces
might be forced to wage?
(3) What goals and missions can be assigned to the armed forces in anticipation
of such a war, and what armed forces must the nation possess in order to
achieve the stated goals?
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(4) Proceeding from this, how should the nation caiT>' out militar>' structuring
to prepare the army and countr)' for war?
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Figure 3.1 Principal Relationships in Soviet Military Terminology
[Ref. 22:p. 69]
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Militar>' doctrine has two sides: (1) the socio-political side, which is based on
the Marxist-Leninist theory of war and deals with preparing the nation's economic
and social base for war, and (2) the military-technical side, which, in accordance
with the socio-political goals, deals with preparing the nation's armed forces for
war. The military-technical side has as one of its primary concerns the preparation
of the nation for fighting and surviving a nuclear war. As Marshal Ogarkov,
former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, writes:
The most important position of the military-technical content of Soviet
militar}- doctrine, dictated by the rapid development of the nuclear rocket
weapon and the possibility of its surprise use by the enemy, is the demand to
maintain the Armed Forces of the USSR in high combat readiness
guaranteeing their timely deployment for repulsing a surprise enemy attack,
carrying out powerful retaliatory strikes on him and successfully fulfilling
the set tasks in defense of the socialist fatherland. [Ref. 24:pp. 64-65]
Militar}' science, on the other hand, is "a system of knowledge on the nature
and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war and
the methods of its conduct." [Ref. 23 :p. 74] Unlike military doctrine, military
science is an "objective" field of study open to practical analysis, a field in which
differences of opinion may exist. It includes the theory of military an (which is
itself composed of military strategy, operational art and tactics), the theor>' of
troop control and troop structuring, the theory of military training and education,
and the theor}' of military' economics and rear services. Military doctrine and
military science are interrelated in that doctrine may direct military science to
investigate certain military theories. Conversely, new methods and characteristics
of warfare may emerge over time, bringing about a necessary evolution of military
doctrine [Ref. 26:p. 7].
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Military strategy is that part of military art which "studies the foundations of
the preparation and conduct of war and its campaigns as a whole. In practice it is
policy's direct weapon. With respect to strategy, policy plays the leading and
directing role." [Ref. 27 :p. 75] Military strategy is, as Stephen Meyer explains,
"the operational response to the requirements imposed by military doctrine." [Ref.
21 :p. 472] One of the central tenets of Soviet military strategy, one that has
remained virtually unchanged since the late 1950s, is that having the military force
necessary to fight and win a nuclear war is the best way to deter such a war--and to
ultimately prevail in that war should deterrence fail.
B. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, NUCLEAR WAR, AND
STRATEGIC DEFENSE OF THE U.S.S.R.
At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his
famous secret speech denouncing Stalin and calling for new thinking about
questions of Soviet militar>' science. In the late 1950s the Party and military
leadership in the Soviet Union conducted a thorough examination of contemporary
military problems and the probable nature of a future war. At that time the Soviet
leadership concluded that nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles had
brought about a revolutionary change in the nature of warfare (the "revolution in
military affairs") and that these new weapons would be the decisive factor in any
future war. In his January' 1 960 speech before the Fourth Session of the Supreme
Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev outlined a new Soviet military doctrine in
which "nuclear rocket weapons" played the central, decisive and almost exclusive
role. [Ref. 28 :pp. 41-49]
The concepts embodied in this new doctrine were elucidated over the next few
years by Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovskiy and other authoritative Soviet
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militar>' spokesmen. According to Soviet doctrine of the early 1960s, a future
global war with the West would inevitably take the form of a "nuclear rocket war"
and the newly formed Strategic Rocket Forces would become "the main service of
the Armed Forces." [Ref. 29:p. 120] In 1962 Marshal Malinovskiy explained ho\\'
Soviet military doctrine then foresaw a future war:
A future world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a
decisive armed clash of the opposed social systems: ... it inevitably will be
thermonuclear, a war in which the main means of destruction will be the
nuclear weapon and the basic means of its delivery to the target, the
rocket. ...Now war might arise without the traditional clearly threatening
period, by surprise, as a result of the mass use of long-range rockets armed
with powerful nuclear warheads. [Ref. 30:p. 46]
The new military doctrine of the early 1960s was further delineated in the
1962 volume. Military Strategy , prepared by a group of Soviet military officers
under the direction of a former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal V.D.
Sokolovskiy. Military- Strategy was perhaps the most significant book written in the
Soviet Union on militar>' affairs since the end of World War II. It rejected many
traditional military' principles, such as the concentration of forces on the decisive
axis, the economy of force and the concept of partial victory, and reflected the
views expressed by Khrushchev and Malinovskiy that "a world war, if unleashed by
the imperialists, will inevitably assume the nature of a nuclear-rocket war, i.e., a
war in which the main means of destruction will be nuclear weapons, while the
main means of delivering them to the target will be rockets." [Ref. 17:p. 194]
MilitarN' Strategy explained the tremendous impact of the introduction of nuclear
weapons as follows:
The appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon radically changed previous
concepts of the nature of war. Modem rocket war in its destructive and
death-dealing potential cannot be compared with previous wars. Mass
application of nuclear rocket weapons makes it possible within a ver>' short
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time to force a country from the war, or a number of countries, even those
with relatively large territories, well-developed economies, and populations
on the order of tens of millions. [Ref. 17:p. 1 1 ]
After the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964, however, Soviet military
doctrine began to turn away from its almost exclusive emphasis on nuclear
weapons. The massive, intercontinental employment of nuclear weapons at the
outset of a war was no longer seen as inevitable. As General-Major Tyushkevich
observed in 1978:
After the October (1964) plenary session of [the] CPSU Central Committee,
action was taken to correct certain mistaken views held in military' research
circles as a result of overestimating the capabilities of nuclear weapons, their
effect on the nature of warfare, and their role in the further organizational
development of the Armed Forces." [Ref. 31:p. 471]
Soviet writings since 1965 have increasingly reflected the belief that, while
nuclear weapons still represent the decisive factor in any war between nuclear
powers, future wars might conceivably be conducted with the limited use of nuclear
weapons or with conventional weapons alone. As a 1968 article in the restricted
journal of the Soviet General Staff concluded, "the possibility is not excluded of
wars occurring with the use of conventional weapons, as well as the limited use of
nuclear means in one or several theaters of military operations , or of a relatively
protracted nuclear war using the capabilities of all types of armed forces." [Ref.
32:p. 59] The Soviets recognized too that if a future war could be fought below the
level of intercontinental nuclear war, nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union itself
might be avoided.
The possibility of limiting damage to the Soviet homeland by keeping warfare
below the level of intercontinental nuclear war gave the Soviet leadership great
incentives to develop plans and balanced forces for combat at the conventional and
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limited-nuclear level [Ref. 33:p. 122] As early as 1966, in fact, the Soviets were
seriously discussing a future war fought "with the use of conventional means of
attack, but under threat of the use of nuclear weapons on the part of the enemy."
[Ref. 34:p. 122] Limiting war to the conventional level would not only provide
greater security to the Soviet homeland, but would also increase the probability of
successful offensive operations by removing the disruptive effects on troop control
and offensive rate of advance caused by the use of nuclear weapons [Ref. 33 :p.
Containing a future war at the conventional level, of course, requires achieving
and maintaining superiority over any potential enemy at both the theater and
intercontinental nuclear level, a goal the U.S.S.R. pursued with great determination
throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since achieving strategic nuclear parity
with the United States in the early 1970s, the Soviets have therefore come to believe
that a future war with the West would not necessarily escalate into a global nuclear
war and could, in fact, involve conventional weapons only. The expansion of
nuclear arsenals on both sides has led to "certain changes in the interrelationship
between war and politics" and a situation whereby "thermonuclear war cannot
serve as an ipiplement to achieve political goals." [Ref. 35:pp. 34 and 46] In 1985,
General-Colonel M.A. Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and
currently considered to be the leading Soviet spokesman on military doctrine,
published an explicit critique of certain conclusions set forth in Military Strategy .
According to General Gareyev, due to the tremendous growth in the size and
effectiveness of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, the massive use of nuclear
weapons in war was no longer inevitable. Gareyev argued that:
In the 1960s and 1970s, the authors of this and many other books proceeded
primaril) from the view that a war, under all circumstances, would be waged
employing nuclear weapons and military operations employing solely
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conventional weapons were viewed as a brief episode at the start of a war.
However, the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear missile weapons have
reached such limits where the massed employment of these weapons in a war
can entail catastrophic consequences for both sides. . . Under these
conditions, as is assumed in the West, there will be a greater opportunity for
conducting a comparatively long war employing conventional weapons and
primarily new types of high-precision weapons. The possibility of the
initiating of a nuclear war by the imperialists is also not excluded. [Ref. 36:p.
216]
Significantly, Gareyev does not therefore conclude that the massive buildup of
nuclear arsenals excludes the possibility of war . In fact, he recognizes the
possibility of a protracted conventional war during which the West might initiate
the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, due to the Soviet Union's capacity for nuclear
retaliation, he concludes that the West would be deterred only from the massive use
of nuclear weapons and that a Soviet victory could be achieved through "partial
victories" in conventional or theater-nuclear combined-arms operations [Ref. 36:p.
217]. In particular, Gareyev emphasizes the deterrent role of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, calling them "a sure means for restraining the imperialist aggressors; they
are constandy ready for a devastating retaliatory strike." [Ref. 36:p. 276]
Despite changing Soviet perceptions on the probability of an intercontinental
nuclear war, strategic nuclear strikes remain one of the primary strategic actions of
the Soviet armed forces in the event of war. General-Lieutenant M.M. Kir'yan, a
prominent Soviet military theoretician, wrote in 1985 that the three "basic forms of
strategic action" are: (a) actions by strategic forces; (b) military actions on
continental and maritime (oceanic) theaters; and (c) repulsion of aerospace attacks
of the enemy and defense of the territory of the country from strikes by mass-
destruction weapons." [Ref. 37 :p. 61]
Soviet strategic nuclear attacks would have as their primary objectives the
destruction of the enemy's strategic nuclear forces, his military-economic potential
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and political-administrative centers [Ref. 17:p. 282], While not openly advocating
"preventive war" or a first-strike strategy, the Soviets emphasize that the initial
period of war is the most decisive period. During this period preemption of an
enemy's nuclear attack in order to limit damage to the Soviet Union itself is
considered a crucial element in Soviet warfighting strategy. According to Military
Strategy , "damage limiting" forces include both offensive and defensive forces :
survivable strategic offensive forces which can "contribute to the 'damage limiting'
by crushing the enemy's nuclear means of attack at the launch sites and bases";
national air defense forces, including antiaircraft defenses and ballistic missile
defenses (and, although left unstated, probably antispace defense forces);
antisubmarine warfare forces; and also civil defenses, capable of reducing "by
about three times of the losses among the population from the consequences of the
enemy's nuclear strikes." [Ref. 17:p. 63]
National air defense of the Soviet Union is part of the Soviet military's third
major form of strategic actions and, as will be outlined in more detail in the
following chapter, consists of integrated antiaircraft, antimissile and antispace
defense. The most crucial role of national air defense in Soviet strategy is the
protection of the rear areas of the country and groupings of the armed forces from
nuclear attack. This idea is somewhat reminiscent of the first of Stalin's five
"permanently operating factors" - protecting the stability of the rear. The 1963
edition of Militar\' Strategy described this mission as follows:
The basic means for protecting the interior of the country and groups of
Armed Forces from enemy nuclear attacks are the National PVO
[antiaircraft] and PRO [antimissile] Troops, and also civil defense forces.
They have the task of creating an invincible system for the defense of the
entire country, and also preparing measures for rapid removal of the results
of enemy nuclear attacks. Such a system should be prepared beforehand, in
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peacetime, and should be in a constant state of high combat readiness. [Ref.
17:p.297]
Besides protecting the Soviet Union in the event of a nuclear attack, Soviet
national air defense can also play a most significant role in "restraining" the West
from nuclear escalation by helping to assure the survivability of Soviet nuclear
forces and their associated command and control systems.^ As one Soviet military
author wrote in 1983, "modem concepts of non-nuclear war envisage the
achievement of strategic results with conventional means together with readiness to
repulse nuclear attack." [Ref. 39:p. 125 (emphasis added)]
Although Soviet public pronouncements have become more and more
circumspect over the years, Soviet interest in national air defense as an effective
instrument in the ongoing political-military competition with the West has
remained relatively constant. Soviet commentar>' in the 1960s was most explicit in
giving national air defense a major role in a future war. According to the
authoritative 1962 reference work, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army , "the
main role in the [nuclear rocket] war will be played by the Strategic Rocket Troops
and also the Troops of PVO (air defense) and PRO (antimissile defense)." [Ref.
40:p. 45] Militar>^ Strategy observes:
Military operations for the protection of the interior of the countrx' and
groups of the Armed Forces from aggressor nuclear attacks will have vast
5 "It is worth noting that the Soviets do not equate their concepts of
deterrence—influencing enemy decisions for purposes of war-prevention and
conflict limitation-with those in use in the West. The word sderzhivanie can be
used to denote "containment" as well as "deterrence" or "keeping out" or
"restraining," while the word ustrashenie has a more offensive connotation. As
David Holloway notes, 'Of these two terms it is sderzhivanie , restraining or
holding back, that is used to describe Soviet policy; when ustrashenie
,
intimidation, is used it is applied to Western policy." [Ref. 38 :p. 551]
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scope in a modem war. The aim of these operations will be to ensure the vital
activities of the socialist countries, their economy, the combat capability of
the Armed Forces, and protection of the population. These ends can be
achieved by decisive operations of the country's antiair. antimissile and
antispace defenses aimed at repelling enemy aircraft and rocket attacks, the
complete annihilation of attacking aircraft and rockets beyond the defended
regions and objectives. [Ref. 17:p. 459 (emphasis added)]
Since the late- 1960s, the tone of Soviet discussions on national air defense has
been much more cautious and imprecise. However, national air defense, and
particularly BMD, is still recognized as a primary Soviet wartime mission. In
1971, one Soviet officer wrote that, "under modem conditions, antimissile defense
holds one of the most important places among the other measures of defending the
state against attack by enemy nuclear missiles." [Ref. 41 :p. 108] In the 1973
"Officer's Librar>'" volume, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in
Military Affairs . General-Colonel N.A. Lomov wrote, "the effect of nuclear
weapons on the enemy's militar%' and economic potential, as well as defense against
enemy nuclear strikes comprise the most important task of armed combat under
present-day conditions." [Ref 42:p. 5] In 1985, General Gareyev added:
In the course of a war, decisive significance will be assumed by the prompt
launching of nuclear and fire strikes against the enemy and the skillful use of
their results by the troops, by the combining of massed strikes with the
dispersed location of the troops (forces) and bv the organization of
def>endable defense against enemy weapons of mass destruction . [Ref 36:p.
214 (emphasis addedjj
More recent Soviet pronouncements on military doctrine have emphasized the
importance of preventing war altogether, reflecting General Secretary
Gorbachev's call for "new political thinking in the nuclear age." [Ref 43 :p. 10] In
July 1987, Defense Minister Yazov explained that current Soviet doctrine contains
"new views on force development and the problems of avoiding war." [Ref.
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44:p. 10] As we have seen in the preceding chapter, this shift to a political strategy
of reducing military confrontation with the West has profound implications for the
overall U.S.-Soviet military competition, especially with regard to ballistic missile
defenses. These implications include: an undermining of the West's determination
to support required military spending, especially on ambitious, long-term
programs such as SDI; an infusion of Western resources (capital and technology)
into the Soviet economy, which both directly and indirectly enriches the Soviet
military technology base; and an increase in Soviet commercial access to Western
technology. Soviet militar>' doctrine under Gorbachev has "clearly been designed
to reduce international tensions and provide breathing space for the Gorbachev
restructuring programs to take effect." [Ref. 45 :p. 104] This new doctrine,
however, in no way rejects Soviet views on the nature of war and the necessity for
the Soviet armed forces to prepare to fight a conventional war under the constant
threat of an enemy's use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it in no way rejects long-
held Soviet views on the inevitability of competition with the West and the
continued need for sufficient military power to fight and prevail in the event of
war.
C. BMD AND THE DIALECTIC OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE
According to Soviet military doctrine, war encompasses a broad spectrum of
dynamic offensive and defensive military operations. In Soviet thinking, there
exist strong bonds between the offense and the defense-bonds which are
historically rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory and practical military
considerations:
The offensive and defensive represent two sides of the single process of
armed conflict. In their goals and content, they are opposites but at the same
time they are in close dialectical connection and have a mutual influence on
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each other. New procedures and methods of actions which are employed by
the troops in the offensive sooner or later cause the defender's methods of
counteraction which correspond to them. In exactly the same manner,
changes in the nature of the defense and methods of its conduct have a direct
influence on the attack. [Ref. 46:p. 51]
In the Soviet view, new means of offense inevitably give rise to new means of
defense, which in turn prompt the development of further offensive weapons. This
dialectic process is just as valid today in the era of nuclear weapons. According to
Colonel V.M. Bondarenko, a military theorist at the Lenin Military Political
Academy:
If potential opponents possess weapons of mutual destruction, decisive
advantage goes to that side which first manages to create a defense from it.
The history of military arms development is full of examples in which
weapons which seemed irresistable and frightening are, after some time,
opposed by a sufficiently reliable means of defense. Thus, an absolute limit
to the development of military power . . . cannot exist." [Ref. 47:p. 145]
This theme was echoed by Marshal Ogarkov's 1982 work. Always in Readiness
to Defend the Fatherland :
The experience of past wars persuasively attests to the fact that the
development of new offensive weapons has always inevitably led to the
development of corresponding countermeasures . . . This also applies in full
measure to nuclear missile weapons , the creation and rapid growth of which
compelled militar>'-scientific theory and practice actively to develop means
and methods of countering these weapons. . . The constant contest between
means of attack and means of protection ... is one of the leading sources of
development of militar>' affairs as a whole. [Ref. 48:p. 21]
After the introduction of nuclear weapons, the offense enjoyed clear primacy
over the defense in Soviet military thinking. Offensive operations in general are
still seen as the primary method of achieving victory in war. Offensive operations
can be conducted at various levels of military action - strategic, operational or
tactical - with or without nuclear weapons and are "the only type of combat actions
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of troops, the employment of which attains the complete rout of the enemy and the
seizure of important objectives and areas." [Ref. 49:p. 1] In the Soviet view,
strategic offensive operations are carried out to achieve a particular military-
political goal of the war, such as destruction of enemy strategic groupings or
withdrawal of individual states of an enemy coalition from the war [Ref. 27 :p. 90].
Strategic defense, like strategic offense, has a somewhat broader meaning in
the Soviet Union than it does in the United States. According to the 1986 Soviet
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary , strategic defense is "an aspect of military action
of the Armed Forces, used with the goal of repelling the strategic attack by
formations of the enemy." It is interesting to note that in Soviet thinking, strategic
defense implies not only repelling an attack and thereby protecting vital areas of
one's own territory, but also "creating conditions for seizing the strategic
initiative" and transitioning to the attack [Ref. 50:p. 710]. According to the same
source, strategic defense forces include "systems warning of a nuclear missile
strike, and antispace and antimissile defense forces and means." [Ref. 51 :p. 71 1] In
wartime it would be the primary purpose of these forces to "assure the frustration
of the aggressive intentions of the enemy and his complete destruction by
subsequent operations." [Ref. 17:p. 280]
In 1962, Military Strategy voiced the prevailing view that "the methods and
means of nuclear attack unquestionably predominate over the methods and means
of protection against them." [Ref. 17:p. 204] Ten years later, however, an
authoritative Soviet spokesman pointed out that the current state of offensive
predominance was not necessarily permanent. In his 1972 criticism of "nuclear
fatalism". Colonel A.A. Shirman faulted the "acknowledgement of the
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ovenv'helming superiority of modem offensive weapons over defensive weapons."
He continued:
Nor should one dogmatically absolutize the correlation between offensive
and defensive weapons which prevailed at the initial stage of the present
militan,' technological revolution. History attests to the fact that there are no
offensive weapons which cannot in time be countered with effective defensive
weapons. The correlation between offensive and defensive weapons changed
and will continue to change along with development of the military. This is
attested, for example, by extensive efforts in the area of developing latest-
generation air defense systems, improvement of civil defense, etc. . . An
improvement in the effectiveness of means of defense may substantially
reduce the scale of casualties and destruction connected with the employment
of nuclear weapons. [Ref. 35:pp. 127-128 (emphasis added)]
By the mid-1970s, Soviet military theory had come to reflect a synthesis of
strategic offense and defense and at the level of general nuclear war no longer
clearly distinguished between strategic offense and strategic defense [Ref. 21 :p.
471]. According to a 1980 article in Military Thought , the restricted journal of the
Soviet General Staff, "in the classification of combat means according to their
current effects in combat, the line dividing those means into offense or defense
depending on their combat nature is becoming less distinct." [Ref. 52:p. 18] This
synthesis may have been the result of Soviet perceptions of the objective
technological conditions of current offensive and defensive strategic systems.
In Soviet eyes, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, initiated in March 1983,
threatens to upset this delicate balance of offense and defense by ultimately leading
to the development of new means of offense. Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of
the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, wrote in 1985 that space-based weapons will
inevitably lead to the development of "systems for resisting those weapons, after
which more weapons to combat those weapons will appear." [Ref. 53 :p. 4] In a
1985 interview with Pravda
,
General Secretary Gorbachev observed that, "just as
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the emergence of nuclear weapons . . . only generated an intensified race in nuclear
and conventional arms, so the creation of space weapons will have but one result:
the arms race will become even more intensive and will encompass new spheres."
[Ref. 54:p. 1] In the same year, Marshal Sokolov, then Soviet Minister of Defense,
stated that "only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems can contain the
arms race and make it possible to advance along the road of limiting and reducing
strategic offensive weapons." [Ref. 55 :p. 4]
D. BMD AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN NUCLEAR WAR
The calculation of the "correlation of forces" is a cornerstone of Soviet
strategic planning and is the basis for both political and military decision making.
The Soviets have developed mathematical models for calculating the "correlation
of forces" in nuclear war in which BMD is a significant factor. Writing in Military
Thought in 1967, General-Major I.I. Anureyev, a department head at the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy and a leading Soviet expert on BMD and
antispace defense, presented a dynamic nuclear exchange model which calculated
the correlation of forces following a preemptive nuclear strike. The model
included both strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces and factored in
weapons reliability, force alert status and BMD effectiveness. Anureyev explained
that "a sharp change in the correlation of forces to one's own advantage can be
achieved by means of the mass application of nuclear weapons with the
simultaneous repulsing of a sudden attack by the air-space means of the enemy. "
[Ref. 56:p. 164] This model received significant attention in the restricted Soviet
military literature and seems in general to accurately represent Soviet strategic




= the initial correlation of forces in nuclear weapons
(Qh^ = total TNT equivalent of side H (friendly [Soviet]))
(Qp- = total TNT equivalent of side P (enemy))
I^L-. = Qit/Qh = portion of TNT equivalent delivered by i-t\pe deliver}' vehicle
of friendly side [Soviet]
M-jn = Qjn/Qp = portion of TNT equivalent delivered by j-type deliver>' vehicle
of enemy side
W^_ = probabilil\- of i-type deliver}.- vehicle of friendly [Soviet] side overcoming
enemy defense
^ in- - probability of nondestruction of i-t>pe deliver}' vehicle of riendly
[Soviet] side on ground
Wj^ : Wj^?' = same values respectively, only for enemy side
It is interesting to note that according to this model an\' BNTD effectiveness
whatsoever, unmatched b\- the other side, will ser\-e to change the correlation of
forces in one's favor . More importantly, in confronting an enemy who does not
have a defense against ballistic missile attack, this model clearly demonstrates the
Soviet belief that the correlation of forces will increase in their favor with only
small increases in the effectiveness of their own BMP system . In fact, disregarding
the other terms, with no corresponding U.S. HMD system (^\n= 1.0), the
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correlation of forces increases exponentially in the Soviet favor as the effectiveness
of their own defensive system increases. Assuming no U.S. defenses, even a Soviet
BMD sytem that is only 25% effective (Wj^ = .75) would increase the correlation of
forces in the Soviet favor by 33%. One that is 50% effective would fully double the
initial correlation. Conversely, deployment of an effective U.S. BMD system
would quickly negate this Soviet advantage. The keen Soviet interest in preventing
or limiting SDI deployment is therefore quite understandable.
Stephen Meyer has constructed a hypothetical Soviet model of the nulcear
correlation of forces which uses the Anureyev analytical model and represents the
correlation of forces as Soviet strategic planners might see it in the late 1990s [Ref.
57]. The analysis uses recently declassified CIA estimates of Soviet force levels for
the year 1994 and Congressional projections of U.S. force levels. According to
Meyer's analysis, the correlation of forces following a Soviet preemptive attack
with mid-1990's forces would be 3.4-4.0 in the Soviet favor, depending on Soviet
force alert status and Moscow BMD effectiveness. This figure assumes no U.S.
BMD system. Since the correlation of forces is a function of U.S. BMD
effectiveness, U.S. BMD deployment would decrease the correlation to a point
where, with a 60% effective U.S. BMD system deployed, the correlation of forces
would be 1.0, "indicating that a full-scale Soviet pre-emptive (or, first) strike
against the US would achieve little beyond second-strike nuclear parity." [Ref.
57:p. 284] U.S. BMD effectiveness above 60% would tilt the correlation of forces
in the American favor. This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 3.2.
The Anureyev correlation of forces model is also consistent with Soviet policy
statements on the effectiveness of BMD systems. Despite fantastic claims by
Khrushchev and others to the contrary in the early 1960's, BMD, along with air
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defense, space defense and civil defense, contributes to the overall strategic defense
effort even though it may never itself approach 100% effectiveness. As one Soviet
spokesman has justified their civil defense program, "To save just 1 percent of the
Soviet population would mean to save 3 million people. No one in this countr\'
would understand the government if it failed to strive for this." [Ref. 58:p. V-1]
Any amount of damage limitation is valued - therefore any amount of BMD
effectiveness is good, as the Anureyev model most clearly demonstrates. Thus, in
the context of a preemptive strategy, the primary role of Soviet strategic defenses
might be to limit damage caused by "the forces remaining to the United States after
a preemptive strike." In fact, "such a mission could significantly reduce the
technical requirements put upon a BMD system. BMD does not have to carry the
brunt of thwarting an enemy attack." [Ref. 2:p. 187] Even an imperfect Soviet
BMD system could therefore play a critical role in ensuring the survival of the
Soviet Union as a political system, a functioning society and a post-war military
power. More importantly, an initially limited Soviet BMD system can be
incrementally improved over time.
In summ,ary, strategic offense and strategic defense are both integral parts of
Soviet militar>' doctrine and strategy. While the offense has enjoyed predominance
over the defense since the introduction of nuclear weapons, this predominance has
not ruled out a continued and vigorous Soviet strategic defense effort. Moreover,
this strategic defense effort occurs not in opposition to strategic offense, but
"within the context of a continued parallel stress on the necessity for overwhelming
offensive forces." [Ref. 59 :p. viii] Offense and defense are thus inexorably linked





























Case I -- Soviet force estimates at peacetime readiness levels
Case II -- Case I forces plus Soviet SSBNs at 50% alert; strategic
aircraft at 3096 alert; air defense effectiveness at 259c
Case in -- Case II forces and readiness levels plus Soviet BMD
effectiveness at 159o
Figure 3.2 Soviet Correlation of Nuclear Forces vs. SDI Effectiveness
[Ref. 57:p. 284]
The Soviets have never resigned themselves to the American concept of
"mutual assured destruction", but rather have attempted to arm themselves for
conducting and surviving a nuclear war. A key element in Soviet nuclear
warfighting strategy is damage limitation. With the coming of nuclear parit>', the
Soviets have recognized that even a preemptive strike against U.S. strategic forces
could not hope to avert the dangers of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, in order to
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defeat the United States in the event of war while at the same time presening the
Soviet Union as a viable society and the dominant power in the post-war world,
defense against ballistic missile attack has become crucial. As Marshal of Aviation
G.V. Zimin, Commandant of the Zhukov Military Command Academy of Air
Defense, wrote in 1976,
"
now victory or defeat in war has become dependent on
how much the state is in a position to reliably defend the important objects on its
territory from the destruction of strikes from air or space ." [Ref. 60:p. 127
(emphasis added)]
Additionally, the fundamental connection in Soviet thinking between offense
and defense has profound implications for Soviet weapons acquisition strategies and
force structures. The Soviets recognize the inevitable and often "revolutionary"
advancement of militar>' technology and believe that "the side which first creates an
antimissile (antispace) defense will have a most important strategic advantage
which would allow the threatening of war or its unleashing without fear of the
enemv's reta]iator\' strikes ." [Ref. 17:p. 91 (emphasis added)] Continued advances
in BMD technology, as pan of what they perceive to be the historical dialectic of
offense and defense, are to be expected and exploited.
Furthermore, the Soviets would app>ear to be extremely unlikely to forego
research and development in strategic defenses merely because of the current
predominance of offensive strategic nuclear weapons. While the U.S. chose to
downgrade investments in ballistic missile defense activities for several years after
signing the ABM Treaty in 1972, even a cursory look at Soviet strategic defense
programs over the same time reveals a steady, purposeful effort to provide the
U.S.S.R. with some measure of defense against ballistic missile attack. Therefore,
despite the limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty on BMD deployments, ballistic
41
missile defenses will in all likelihood continue to play a crucial role in Soviet
military strategy. In order to better understand and estimate just how the Soviet
BMD program might develop in the future, it is first necessary to examine in some
detail the Soviet concepts of national air defense and ballistic missile defense as
defined by Soviet military science.
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IV. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE:
SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS
Discussions of BMD in the open Soviet press have historically been cloaked in
secrecy and innuendo. In assessing Soviet statements on BMD, Michael Deane in
1980 characterized Soviet military literature as reflecting an "absolute void with
regard to Soviet anti-missile and anti-space weaponry." [Ref. 61 :p. 50] This silence
has probably been due as much to the Soviets' desire to ensure secrecy about their
BMD capabilities as it is to reap the propaganda benefits of denying that these
capabilities exist in the first place. For example, prior to signing the ABM Treaty
the Soviets openly discussed BMD in their professional literature, even on one
occasion announcing the operational range of the Galosh interceptor. After 1972,
however, nearly all references to their own BMD systems disappeared from the
open literature. Since the mid-1980s, however, some Soviet statements intended
for Western audiences have acknowledged the Soviet interest in certain military
uses of space [Ref. 62:p. 39]. The Soviets nevertheless deny any interest in
obtaining BMD capabilities more extensive than those permitted by the ABM
Treaty, and assert that the U.S.S.R. has no interest in developing what the Soviets
term "space-strike weapons."
In order to maintain secrecy while at the same time educating their officer
corps (and, to some extent, the Soviet public at large) about these sensitive militar>'
topics, Soviet authors frequently attribute such concepts and systems to "foreign"
sources. As William Scott writes, "the use of alleged materials from the 'foreign
press' to keep members of their armed forces informed on current weaponry and
military concepts is a standard practice throughout the Soviet Armed Forces."
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[Ref. 63 :p. 2] The Defense Intelligence Agency observes that the "use of the
qualifier 'foreign' is particularly widespread in Soviet treatment of military space
issues, largely because Soviet propaganda denies any Soviet military exploitation of
outer space." [Ref. 64:p. 9] Careful analysis of such "foreign" materials in the
Soviet military press may therefore yield significant insights about Soviet concepts
for space operations. Soviet discussions of "foreign" activities and systems may, in
other words, reveal what the Soviets themselves deem important.
A. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
As shown in the preceding chapter, Soviet military doctrine currently
anticipates national air defense of the Soviet Union to be one of the three priman,'
strategic actions of the Soviet armed forces in a future war.^ National air defense is
perceived by the Soviets to be an integrated defense against all means of an enemy
air attack. According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia , national air defense
includes "the aggregate of national measures and troop combat operations carried
out to defend. . . the country' against destruction from the air." [Ref. 65:p. 588] The
basic handbook for all Soviet air defense officers, published in 1981, defines enemy
"aerospace attack forces" as including "ballistic missiles, aerodynamic and space
airborne platforms, dirigibles, and balloons." [Ref 66:p. 16] Thus, Soviet national
air defense encompasses much more than defense against aircraft. As the 1963
6 A difficulty arises in translating the Russian phrase, protivovozdushnaya
oborona
,
or "PVO." PVO can refer to both the broader Soviet concept of strategic
air defense against aircraft, ballistic missiles, satellites and space weapons as well as
to the more narrow concept of antiaircraft defense. For clarity, the author will use
"national air defense" when referring to the broader meaning of air defense (i.e.,
including antimissile and antispace defense) and "antiaircraft defense" for the more
restricted meaning.
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edition of Military Strategy confirms, "Modem air defense is built to be
antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispace united in a single system." [Ref. 17:p. 297]
Further explanation of this Soviet concept is given by the 1967 Tolkovw Slovar'
Vo\enn\kh Terminov (Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terminology), which
states:
Air defense (Protivovozdushnaya Oborona ) is defense from an air enemy. It
includes antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispace defense . One differentiates
air defense of the countr)', of troops, and of naval forces. . . Air defense of
the countr>' is the totality of general-state measures and combat actions of air
defense troops supponing the active shielding of vitally important regions,
administrative-political and industrial centers, industrial enterprises, roads,
strategic and other objects. The missions of air defense of the country' are
carried out by the Troops of National Air Defense. [Ref. 67 :p. 347 (emphasis
added)]
Thus, in the Soviet view, national air defense is accomphshed by a unified
military system"^ for defense of the country against enemy air threats, including
traditional antiaircraft defense (including sea-based systems), BMD and antispace
defense. The Soviet national air defense system can be schematically represented as
shown in Figure 4.1,
7 As John Hines and George Kraus point out, "While Western defense
planners normally apply the term "system" somewhat narrowly to a specific
weapon and its ancillary equipment, Soviet military planners use the term to










Figure 4.1 The Soviet National Air Defense System
Due to its critical importance in Soviet perceptions of a future war, national air
defense "has been made an independent categor>' of combat action" [Ref. 31 :p. 474]
and is carried out by an entirely separate service of the Soviet military, the Troops
of Air Defense {Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony, or V-PVO).^ Military
Strategy states that "this service of the Armed Forces [Troops of National Air
Defense]^ was created for the purpose of antiair (PVO) and antimissile (PRO)
defense of the country. Its mission, in conjunction with the PVO troops of the
Ground Forces, is to prevent penetration by enemy means of air attack into the air
8 The V-PVO generally ranks number three in precedence within the Soviet
armed forces, following the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces, but
ahead of the Air Forces and Navy. [Ref. 28: p. 159]
9 In 1981 the Troops of National Air Defense (Voyska PVO Strany ) became
the Troops of Air Defense {Voyska PVO ) as part of a general reorganization of
Soviet air defense forces.
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space of the country and to prevent his nuclear attacks against the most important
regions and objectives of the country
. . .
." [Ref. 17:p. 251] General-Major
Tyushkevich wrote in 1978 that, "a vital necessity for our National Air Defense
Forces was the creation of an impenetrable defense covering the country's rear
installations and troop groupings." [Ref. 31:p. 474 (emphasis added)]
According to both the 1965 Dictionar\' of Basic Military Terms and the 1967
Tolkovw Sloxar' Vo\enn\kh Terminov (Explanatory Dictionary of Military
Terminology), BMD is an integral component of national air defense [Ref.
68:p.l78; Ref. 69:p. 351]. Therefore, within the larger framework of national air
defense of the Soviet homeland, BMD plays a major role.
B. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BMD AND ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
It is useful to begin an analysis of Soviet BMD operational concepts with the
Soviet dictionary' definition of ballistic missile defense. Unlike U.S. dictionaries,
Soviet military dictionaries, such as the Soviet Military Encyclopedia and the
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary , are "ihe basic authoritative source for the
meaning of Soviet military concepts." [Ref. 70:p. 9] According to the 1986
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary , ballistic missile defense {Prolixoraketnaya
Oborona ) is defined as:
A system of forces and means as well as the measures and military actions for
repelling enemy nuclear missile attacks by defeating ballistic missiles or their
warheads in flight. Antimissile defense consists of: means for long-range
detection of ballistic missiles, antimissile complexes for various long-range
actions, complexes of computer facilities, and means for the transmission of
information. Depending on its mission, the PRO system may be territorial
(for defense of the whole country), zonal (for defense of large areas) or
objective (for defense of important administrative, industrial and military
objectives). [Ref. 71 :p. 598]
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Furthermore, both the Dictionary of Basic Military Terms and the Tolkovw
Slovar' Voyennykh Terminov include the idea that electronic countermeasures
may also play a major role in combating enemy ballistic missiles [Ref. 68 :p. 178;
Ref. 69:p. 351]. In describing a ballistic missile defense system in the 1962 and
1963 editions of Military Strategy . Marshal Sokolovskiy mentions "jamming
devices to assure deflection of the missile from its intended target and, possibly, to
blow it up along its trajector>'" as a primary component of a BMD system [Ref.
17:p. 454]. Interestingly, description of the use of electronic countermeasures in a
BMD system was omitted from the 1968 edition of Military Strategy and has since
not appeared in any published Soviet definition of BMD. William F. Scott has
postulated that a general tightening of Soviet security may have occurred in the
early 1970s [Ref. 63 :p. 23] and, as a result, Soviet definitions and descriptions of
BMD published in the 1960s may be more detailed than those published afterwards.
Significantly, later definitions seem in no way to contradict earlier ones, but merely
treat the subject in a much more general manner.
According to these definitions, the Soviets consider BMD to be an integral part
of a country's national air defense effort, in close association with antiaircraft
defense. BMD consists not only of the procedures and tactics for countering
ballistic missile attack (i.e., "measures and military actions"), but, as the literature
clearly implies, also dedicated men and equipment (i.e., "forces and means").
Organizationally, the Soviets conceive of BMD as being composed of four major
components: long range sensors, BMD fire complexes, computer facilities and
means of communications.
The first component of the BMD system, long-range detection of ballistic
missiles, is carried out by a branch of the Troops of Air Defense (V-PVO), the
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Radio-Technical Troops [Ref. 42:p. 95]. Within the V-PVO, Radio-Technical
Troops perform "the mission of continuous monitoring of the air space, radar
reconnaissance of enemy aerial attack forces in flight, issuance of information
about them to the command element for development of the battle plan, and support
of the combat operations of the SAM troops and PVO aviation." [Ref. 66:p. 178]
The Soviets currently speak of radar, including early warning and over-the-
horizon radars, as the primary' sensor of a BMD system for long-range detection of
ballistic missiles. General Anureyev stated in 1971 that, "early warning radars
deployed on the major missile-threatening directions are considered to be the basic
early warning devices." [Ref. 41 :p. 119] According to a 1973 Soviet assessment,
"the capabilities of radar equipment have been far from exhausted." [Ref. 42:p. 96]
In addition to active radar detection, the Soviets are also interested in more "exotic"
early warning sensors including those placed on ships, submarines, aircraft,
satellites and "detection facilities launched by special rockets." [Ref. 72:p. 6]
Since "the identification of the warhead should occur in the middle leg of the
trajectory" for successful intercept, space-based missile early warning systems play
a critical role due to their ability to "observe the area of [enemy] missile bases for
an extended time." [Ref. 42:pp. 65,67] Using infrared detection devices aboard a
satellite pointed at the horizon, Soviet experts calculate that it would be possible to
detect an ICBM shortly after it leaves the troposphere (approximately 10 to 15
kilometers in altitude) [Ref. 42:p. 57] Soviet specialists also point out the potential
active defense role of these early warning satellites:
In the future, American specialists feel it possible, in combination with a
ground anti-missile system or anti-missile missiles placed on the satellite
itself, to intercept ballistic missiles, the launching of which has been detected
by an [early warning] satellite. Thus, the early warning system based on
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[early warning] satellites in the long run is also designed for antimissile
defenses. [Ref. 42:p. 58]
In addition to conventional radar and infrared systems, the following
technologies are frequently discussed in the Soviet literature as having potential for
long-range detection of ballistic missiles: advanced infrared systems, active radar
satellites and laser radars as well as various other sensors to detect the radio
frequency radiation from the jet trail of a missile's engines, the ionospheric
disturbance caused by a high-speed reentry vehicle or the low frequency acoustic
waves produced during missile launch. [Ref. 42:pp. 54-72]
The second major component of the BMD system is the BMD fire complex. As
defined in the 1986 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary , a BMD fire complex
includes:
... the means for guaranteeing the annihilation of ballistic missile warheads:
antimissiles; launch installations; automated systems for radar detection,
discrimination and tracking of warheads and for the guidance of antimissiles;
command posts with computer, control apparatus, data transmission and
communications facilities. In range, BMD fire complexes are divided into
long, medium and short range complexes. [Ref. 73:p. 507]
The Soviet Militan>^ Encyclopedia further clarifies the distinctive roles of the
three types of BMD fire complexes. It adds that the long range complexes are
designed to defeat (porazhenie ) re-entry vehicles
"
until their entry into the dense
layers of the atmosphere" in defense of large regions. The medium range
complexes are for defense of "separate important regions" and are designed to
defeat re-entry vehicles "on the final stages of their trajectory at the boundary of
the dense layers of the atmosphere." Finally, the short range complexes are
designed for the point defense of military objectives, such as "underground ICBM
launch positions." The short range complexes are meant to destroy
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(unichtozheniya) ballistic missile warheads "after they enter the dense layers of the
atmosphere." [Ref. 74:p. 12] Of some interest, the same source also includes the
idea that the BMD fire complex radar system should be "integrated", presumably
meaning that terminal BMD radars should be integrated with other national radar
systems.
BMD fire complexes form the heart of the current Soviet BMD system. They
are most probably manned by Zenith Rocket Troops, another branch of V-PVO.
These troops are tasked with "preventing enemy air strikes against the country's
most important targets, as well as troop groupings." [Ref. 66:pp. 4, 244] In many
respects, Soviet description of a BMD fire complex parallels that of a typical V-
PVO SAM site, a detailed description of which is given in the Soviet Air Defense
Officer's Handbook [Ref 66:p. 246].
"Antimissiles" deployed at a BMD fire complex are a type of high speed
surface-to-air missile, capable of velocities in excess of Mach 10, for intercepting
enemy "strategic, operational-tactical and tactical missiles and their warheads."
[Ref. 75:pp. 597-598] According to the Soviet definition, antimissiles can be
equipped with either high explosive or nuclear warheads [Ref. 75 :p. 598]. In 1971
the single shot probability of one antimissile successfully hitting an incoming
warhead, according to unspecified "U.S." sources cited by General Anureyev, was
reported as approximately 20-25 percent [Ref 41 :p. 110]. As was shown in the
previous chapter, a 25% effective Soviet BMD system would increase the
correlation of forces in the Soviet favor by a third.
It is important to recognize that the Soviets state directly that antimissiles can be
deployed at both BMD fire complexes and also at conventional V-PVO SAM sites
[Ref. 75:p. 598], Antimissiles deployed as part of a SAM site are for defense
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against both "operational-tactical" (up to 300 km range) and "tactical" (up to
50 km range) ballistic missiles as well as against enemv aircraft [Ref. 76:p. 603].
In assessing purported BMD developments in the United States in the early 1970s,
the Soviets observed that "mobile [BMD] systems are being created which
supposedly will be able to intercept aircraft, flying bombs and tactical missiles ."
[Ref. 42:p. 97]
According to General Anureyev, ballistic missile interception on the terminal
leg of the trajectory "has been worked on the most." [Ref. 42 :p. 65] Terminal
interception requires distinguishing the warheads from the decoys after they
reenter the atmosphere where drag forces "filter" the lighter decoys. Since this
occurs at altitudes between 70-100 kilometers, "it is essential to use high-speed
[antimissiles] in order to intercept the attacking missile as far away as possible from
the defended object." [Ref. 41 :p. 115] Interestingly, these statements about the need
for high speed antimissiles were published in 1971, long prior to deployment of the
SH-08 Gazelle endoatmospheric interceptor. At that time the Soviet BMD system
clearly lacked an endoatmospheric interceptor and was equipped only with the
Galosh exoatmospheric interceptor. These Anureyev statements may therefore be
interpreted as an indication of perceived requirements at an early phase of the
decisions regarding the development of the SH-08 Gazelle.
A simple model for calculating the required number of antimissiles for various
types of BMD systems was presented in General Anureyev's Antimissile and Space
Defense Weapons
.
This model probably assumes perfect interceptor reliability and
no MIRVs or decoys. However, the model was published without the usual
obligatory Soviet disclaimer about it being based on "foreign" sources and may, in
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a vcr>' general way, represent Soviet thinking on antimissile effectiveness. The
model is shown in Figure 4.2.
1 — ad:-: defenses absent; 2 -- 100 lrv;-altitude AI'.M of
object ABM Fysten; 3 — 100 high -alt Ltude AKM of zonal
ABM defense operating without conslcerlng preference
principle; ^ — 100 high-altitude A\y. of zcnal AEM sys-
ten operating considering preference principle; 5 —
500 lov:-altltude AKi'i of cbject ADM defense; 6 — area
of ADM defense operating v;lthout considering preference
priiKiple; 7 — area of zcnal ABM defense operating con-
sidering preference principle
Key:
a. Relative number of hit
targets, percent
b. liurr.ber of LRBM
Figure 4.2 "Graphs for Calculating the Necessary Number of AMM
[Antimissiles] With Var>'ing Organization of ABM System" [Ref. 4 1 :p. 1 1 7]
This model was published about one year before conclusion of the ABM Treaty
with the United States, which limited the Soviet Union to 100 antimissile
interceptors. Interestingly, according to this model, a zonal BMD system with 100
high-altitude interceptors, such as the Moscow BMD system, which employed
preferential defense tactics could successfully defend all preferentially defended
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targets against 100 attacking ICBMs. Reading from the graph, the system could
also provide 50% effective defense against a 200 missile attack, 20% effective
defense against a 500 missile attack and, by interpolating the x-axis, roughly 10%
effective defense against a 1,000 missile attack. Since the same source put the
number of U.S. ICBMs at 1,054 by the end of 1970 [Ref. 41 :p. 32], it might be
assumed that the effectiveness of the Moscow BMD system, in the years prior to
MIRVed ICBMs, can be estimated using this Soviet model.
Soviet fleet air defense is another integral component of Soviet national air
defense that can also contribute to the BMD mission. Air defense of Soviet naval
forces is conducted with "the antiaircraft weapons of ships and naval bases and
naval fighter aviation in coordination with the National Air Defense Forces and the
Ground Forces." [Ref. 77 :p. 587] According to General Anureyev, "the antimissile
defenses of the coastal zone and naval bases under modem conditions . . . should
comprise part of the unified ABM system of the nation." For ships in port, "the
antimissile defense of the ships in almost no way differs from the ABM missions
carried out by the ABM forces of the nation." For ships at sea in coastal waters,
"defense is also organized in close coordination with the ABM forces of the nation."
Soviet naval forces can play a role in "detecting the enemy offensive aerospace
weapons, and
. . . repelling their strikes by antimissile weapons." [Ref. 41:p. 191]
The Soviet literature recognizes that one of the major advantages of sea-based
BMD weapons is the fact that "intercepting of the [ICBM] warheads far from the
defended territory will not threaten the population with radiation danger."
Additionally, sea-based BMD allows for the possibility of intercepting warheads in
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mid-course prior to the separation of decoys and reentry vehicles. [Ref. 41 :p.
192J10
The Soviet literature of the 1960s and early 1970s is also rich with references
to ftiture BMD weapons based on directed energy technologies. Among the
specific areas mentioned as having particular promise for ballistic missile defense
are lasers, pulsed or enhanced radiation weapons, radio frequency energy weapons,
and high energy particle beams [Ref. 79:pp. 79-80]. According to Colonel-
Engineer L. Migunov, "a high-energy laser device installed in a [satellite] is
considered an effective weapon for destroying ballistic missiles in the active
portion of the trajector>'." [Ref. 72:p. 7]
Kinetic energy weapons and weapons using conventional warheads are also
identified as having great potential for BMD because the "use of nuclear warheads
for these targets [enemy warheads] is considered unadvisable since a series of
nuclear explosions in space would weaken ground-based radar systems for warhead
detection and tracking." [Ref. 80:pp. 80-81] A 1982 article in the journal
Technology and Armaments explains:
In order to destroy missile nose cones, it is proposed that ABMs charged with
a conventional explosive as well as fragmentation components be used. It is
assumed that detonation of a conventional explosive charge can be effective
for destroying a long-range [ballistic missile] (in the active portion of the
trajector>) as well as for destroying the nose cone of medium- and short-
range ballistic missiles when the ABM is launched from a [satellite]. In the
atmospheric portion of the trajectory, a nose cone can be relatively reliably
10 Interestingly, although General Anureyev speaks of integrating naval units
into the nation's BMD system, the Soviet naval literature itself reflects no mention
of "anti-ballistic missile systems or other air defense forces and systems which
could counter cruise or ballistic missiles launched from sea or transiting the ocean
airspace." [Ref. 78: p. 59]
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destroyed as the result of mass employment of guided and unguided missiles.
[Ref. 72:p. 7]
The final two components of the BMD system are its automated computer
facilities and its means for information transmission. These two interrelated
elements are crucial to the control of the BMD system. According to one Soviet
expert, "automated information and command systems are essential for
coordinating the actions of the forces and means of such a complex aerospace
defense." [Ref. 41 :p. Ill] Unfortunately, little information on BMD technical
control equipment or procedures is published in the open literature. Nevertheless,
Soviet authors recognize that significant computational power is required to
process sensor data and discriminate warheads from decoys, track incoming
warheads, calculate missile intercept vectors and assign weapons systems for
engagement. As one Soviet author puts it:
The carrying out of this most important mission in a nuclear war is
inconceivable without using modem systems of automated control over the
active air defense weapons where time is measured in fractions of a second.
[Ref. 42:p. 6]
By integrating the published Soviet definitions of BMD, it becomes clear that
the Soviets view BMD as an integral component of their overall national air defense
effort. BMD is closely connected with traditional antiaircraft defense and in many
respects, the missions and means of BMD and antiaircraft defense overlap.
According to General-Major M.I. Cherednichenko, faculty member at the
Voroshilov General Staff Academy and contributing author of Marshal
Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy , "the air defense troops consist of fighter aviation,
antiaircraft missile troops, and radar troops, as well as forces and means for
warning of a missile attack and monitoring outer space ." [Ref. 42:p. 95 (emphasis
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added)] In the Soviet military', BMD forces probably include dedicated men and
equipment whose primar>' purpose is the destruction of enemy ballistic missiles,
both what we in the West call "strategic" balhstic missiles and "tactical" ballistic
missiles. Currently the primary Soviet BMD weapon is the ground-launched
antimissile. However, electronic countermeasures and, in the future, directed
energy and kinetic energy weapons may also play a major role in countering an
enemy ballistic missile attack.
It is important to note that, according to Soviet discussions, current BMD
weapons may be deployed at both BMD fire complexes and also at conventional
SAM sites. Antimissiles deployed at S.A.M sites are truly dual-purpose weapons.
able to be used against ballistic missiles as well as aircraft [Ref. 76:p. 603]. With
this Soviet operational concept in mind, it would seem quite natural that the Soviet
miliiar)' would seek to develop and deploy a missile system, such as the SA-10 or
SA-12, capable of performing in both an antimissile and antiaircraft role. This
Soviet operational concept clearly states a Soviet requirement to field ATBMs and,
with continuing advances in missile system technology, comes close to
contradicting article VI, paragraph (a) of the ABM Treaty, in which the Soviet
Union specifically pledged "not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than
ABM interceptor missiles. ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory', and not to test them
in an ABM mode." The problems posed for Western security by these Soviet
"strategic SAMs" will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
In addition to its close ties with antiaircraft defense, BMD is also integrated
with the antispace defense mission in the Soviet literature. This relationship, and
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the implications it holds for the future of Soviet BMD, will be examined in the
following section.
C. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF BMD AND ANTISPACE DEFENSE
Soviet BMD is closely related to antispace defense as part of the larger Soviet
concept of national air defense. In the Soviet view, defense against enemy space
weapons will be of critical importance in a future war. Claiming to report the
views of "foreign military specialists", Soviet experts write that "airspace and outer
space [are] a strategically inseparable medium above the earth's surface, where
military actions will be of important significance for armed combat as a whole.
According to the views of the U.S. military leaders, outer space will be a unique
theater of military actions in which the same fierce combat may develop as in the
air in the past." [Ref 42:p. 55] A 1983 article in Aviation and Cosmonautics states
that "in the future space will become the principal theater of military operations ."
[Ref 81 :p. 99 (emphasis added)] According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia :
Bourgeois experts regard space warfare as part of war as a whole. It may be
conducted during a war, precede the unleashing of a war, or constitute the
beginning of a war. Space-to-space, space-to-surface, and surface-to-space
combat operations are considered possible during a space war, depending on
the objectives, conditions and time. [Ref 82:pp. 86-88]
In Soviet thinking, antispace defense is a major component of both national air
defense and space warfare. ii The 1986 Military Encvclopedic Dictionary defines
antispace defense (Protivokosmicheskaya Oborona or PKO) as "a system of forces
1' The Soviets divide "space weapons" into three major categories: (1) space
systems for supporting combat operations of the services of the armed forces, (2)
space weapons for making attacks from outer space against enemy spacecraft and
ground targets, and (3) antimissile and antispace defense weapons. [Ref. 41: p.
64] SeealsoRef 42:p. 55
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and means, as well as the measures and combat actions for detecting and destroying
(putting out of action) space vehicles." It includes both the means for monitoring
space and for destroying spacecraft. Intercepting and destroying enemy spacecraft
may be carried out by "special complexes for launching automatic satellite
interceptors and aiming them at enemy space vehicles, as well as by BMP fire
complexes. " [Ref. 83 :p. 596] According to both the 1965 Dictionary of Basic
Militar\- Terms and the 1967 Tolkovw Slovar' Vo\enn\kh Terminov . antispace
defense, like ballistic missile defense, is also a "component part" of national air
defense [Ref. 84:p. 177; Ref. 85:pp. 348-349].
Since the launch of Sputnik I in 1957, Soviet spokesmen have asserted that all
Soviet space operations are for "peaceful purposes." [Ref. 63 :p. 17] In the mid-
1960s the Soviet Union adopted a declaratory policy of excluding space as a
possible arena of action for Soviet militar>' forces. The Soviets have subsequently
attributed attempts to militarize space to the United States. Consequently, after
signing the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, Soviet authors became much more
circumspect in their discussions of antispace defenses. For example, the 1968
edition of Military Strategy was selectively purged of references to the military use
of space. One section entitled "Problems of Using Outer Space for Military
Purposes," which in the 1962-63 editions had appeared in the chapter "Methods of
Conducting Warfare," was omitted. Instead, much of the section was moved to
another chapter entitled "Military Strategy of Imperialist Countries." [Ref. 63:p.
49] Furthermore, since at least 1978, Soviet military dictionaries have strictly
defined both antispace defense and space warfare as "foreign" concepts [Ref. 83 :p.
596; Ref. 86:p. 594]
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Organizationally, Soviet BMD troops and antispace defense forces are both
components of the V-PVO [Ref. 28:p. 163] and are probably under the operational
control of the Soviet General Staff which directs their employment through the
main staff of the V-PVO. ^ 2 According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia ,
"combat operations involving space and space defense weapons and systems ... are
conducted under the leadership of a country's highest military command." [Ref.
82:p. 86] This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Long range detection of both ballistic missiles and space vehicles is carried out
by the same branch of the V-PVO, the Radio-Technical Troops [Ref. 42:pp. 95-96].
For antispace defense as well as BMD, long range surveillance begins at launch:
Basically the problem [of detecting space objects] is to detect the launch of the
carrier rocket and track it over the active portion of its trajector>' to derive
preliminary data for warning and giving target data to a system for outer
space control. It involves essentially the same problems faced by antimissile
systems for detecting launches of combat rockets and identical means are
being used for the solution . [Ref. 88:p. 97 (emphasis added)]
As noted in the preceding section, the Soviets distinguish between ballistic
missile interception on the boost, mid-course and terminal phases of the missile's
trajectory. 13 In the Soviet analysis, intercepting ballistic missiles in mid-course is
considered quite similar to intercepting satellites in orbit [Ref. 41 :p. 114].
According to one Soviet spokesman, "the technologies required by the most
sophisticated antisatellite weapons systems are very much similar to those which are
12 There is limited evidence suggesting that Soviet manned space operations
are of primary interest to the Soviet Air Forces [Ref. 63: p. 4] while the launching
of space vehicles is the responsibility of the Strategic Rocket Forces [ Ref. 87: p. 5].
13 More recent Soviet writings distinguish between boost and post-boost
phases of a missile's trajector}'. For example, see Ref. 89: p. 18
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needed to bring down ballistic missiles." [Ref. 90:p. 49] These technologies were
discussed in the previous section and include enhanced radiation, laser, particle
beam, radio frequency and kinetic energy weapons. The Soviets also include
"radio-electronic warfare" as a defensive means "in the struggle against space
weapons." [Ref. 91:pp. 74-75]
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Furthermore, the Soviets consider BMD antimissiles to be one of the primary
weapons for destroying enemy satellites [Ref. 83 :p. 596]. This point is significant
in that the Soviet GALOSH antimissile has been operationally deployed since the
late 1960s, giving the Soviets both a limited BMD capability and an operational
ASAT for the last twenty years. The U.S. Department of Defense has assessed the
Galosh interceptor deployed around Moscow as having "an inherent ASAT
capability against low-altitude satellites." [Ref. 19:p. 52] Additionally, in publicly
confirming that the Soviet Union has an ASAT capability in May 1985, General-
Colonel Nikolay Chervov may have been referring to the GALOSH and not the
Soviet co-orbital ASAT when he described the Soviet ASAT weapon as consisting
of "land-based missiles." [Ref. 92:p. AA5]
Due to the intercept geometry, interception during the boost phase of a
missile's trajectory requires space-based detection and engagement. Soviet
literature since the early 1970s has been somewhat skeptical of the possibilities for
boost phase intercepts, yet at the same time acutely attuned to the potentially
revolutionary advantage such a capability would bring. In 1971 General Anureyev
characterized mid-course and terminal defense as "the basis for setting up the ABM
system." [Ref. 41 :p. 115] Among the perceived drawbacks in the early 1970s of a
boost phase intercept system were the requirements for "great reliability of the
instrumentation", the high cost of such a system, and the susceptibility of the
interceptors to electronic countermeasures. Moreover, for boost phase intercept,
"the limited reaction time for the antimissile defenses excluded the possibility of
rapid decision making." [Ref. 41 :p. 114] This last point is interesting in that it may
imply a Soviet preference for a "man in the loop" in the weapons control process,
rather than a fully automatic system.
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Despite this skepticism, however, Soviet commentators in the early 1970s were
careful to note that "a disturbance of this [offense-defense] equilibrium of forces is
considered possible in line with new scientific discoveries which will make it
possible to . . . create an 'umbrella' ABM system in the form of a dependable screen
over the defended territory." [Ref. 41:p. 118] Because of this possibility,
"forecasting the development of science and technology and determining promising
scientific directions are of urgent significance for developing the armed forces" in
general and for antimissile forces in particular [Ref. 42:p. 72].
Throughout the current anti-SDI propaganda campaign, Soviet commentators
are continuing to stress the technical infeasibility of space-based BNID, while at the
same time urgently warning of the dire consequences should such defenses be
realized. In 1983, Andrei Kokoshin of the Institute of the USA and Canada wrote
that "the overwhelming majority of American specialists have doubts, from a
scientific and technological point of view, about the very possibility of creating any
sort of reliable defense of this type." [Ref. 93:p. 21] Just one year later, however,
Kokoshin seemed to imply that fielding of such a system by the U.S. was a distinct
possibility, warning that "while a space antimissile system is being developed and
deployed, the means of breaking through it will be improved at an accelerated
pace." [Ref. 94:p. 27] Similarly, in his 1985 interview with Time magazine.
General Secretary Gorbachev himself characterized the prospects for a totally
effective space-based antimissile system as "sheer fantasy." [Ref 95 :p. 24] Yet in
the 1986 Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security , several leading Soviet
academics - Yevgeni Velikhov, Roald Sagdeev, and Andrei Kokoshin - while
questioning the technical reliability and operational effectiveness of a space-based
antimissile system, stressed the "enormous dangers for the stability of the strategic
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balance and international security, which might come about should the United
States attempt to develop and deploy a comprehensive ballistic-missile defense."
[Ref. 89:p. 11]
Although certainly motivated chiefly by propaganda purposes, it is quite
possible that Soviet anti-SDI commentary accurately reflects a well thought out
skepticism on the part of the Soviet military regarding the effectiveness of a Soviet
space-based BMD system, as well as a gnawing fear that the United States might
ultimately succeed in developing and deploying just such a system. Unfortunately
there exists no clear confirmation of this hypothesis in the open Soviet military
literature. However, the many problems foreseen by Soviet commentators for a
space-based missile defense system—the high mechanical reliability required of
individual space systems, the extended on-orbit lifetimes required, the extremely
high costs and complexity of servicing a constellation of BMD battle stations, the
uncertain performance of such battle stations under high operational loads, and the
susceptibility of these stations to countermeasures [Ref. 89:pp. 56-64]-are all areas
in which the Soviet Union may see themselves at a technological disadvantage.
Conversely, these are all areas in which the Soviet Union might anticipate U.S.
technological advantage in the future.
While Soviet military literature has historically been quite skeptical of the
potential for effective space-based BMD, manned space platforms have
nevertheless played a particularly important role in Soviet conceptualizations of
space warfare and BMD, as well as in Soviet thinking about the future of armed
conflict in general. According to the Soviet literature, "a manned space lab is one
of the basic means for conquering space for military purposes ." [Ref. 41 :p. 96
(emphasis added)] As General Anureyev observes:
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It is felt that from the military viewpoint, the manned satellite opens up a
completely new era. Being ultrafast and operating on a worldwide scale, the
manned satellite will provide an opportunity to exercise constant military
control over the world , and this control will be more accurate and more
effective than the control carried out even by advanced unmanned devices.
The manned spacecraft, in the opinion of American specialists, can achieve
much more than the intercontinental missiles . [Ref. 41 :p. 91 (emphasis
added)]
Therefore, in Soviet concepts of space defense and BMD, manned "orbital
space labs" play a pivotal role. Orbital labs can permit continuous observation of
the earth's surface "to keep track of all missile launches" as well as serve as
weapons platforms for "orbital bombing and using weapons to combat enemy
spacecraft, as well as for intercepting ballistic missiles in the middle portion of
their flight." [Ref. 41:pp. 96,99] The role of manned spacecraft in reconnaissance
is particularly emphasized. As General Anureyev stresses, "the capability of man
to observe objects in space and on the ground, as well as to analyze and assess his
observations gives particular value to a spaceflight." [Ref. 41 :p. 90] In further
describing manned reconnaissance from space. General Anureyev adds that, "the
decisive role is given to the human operator in the reconnaissance spacecraft. . . the
automatic devices merely substantially facilitate the conducting the observations."
[Ref. 41:p. 93] Militar\- Strategy added that, in the view of the Americans, "it is
considered possible to build military stations which can be used as command posts
in space for conducting strategic reconnaissance using all types of reconnaissance
equipment, to intercept satellites in orbit, and also for bombing from space." [Ref.
17:p. 88]
Since the mid-1960s, Soviet descriptions of BMD systems architectures have
included orbital space stations as integral system components (Figure 4.4). In fact,
a 1985 article in Aviation and Cosmonautics showed a modular space station,
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appearing somewhat like a Soviet "Salyut" space station, which served as a platform
for a chemical laser weapon (Figure 4.5).
*
1) antimissile defense weapons;
2) source of electronic interference;
3) rr.issiles to intercept antimissiles;
4) decoys;
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7) satellite to intercept enerr^,' satellites;
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9) long-range enerr^/ ballistic missiles;
10) enerny satel 1 i te;
11) antispace defense weapons.
Figure 4.4 "American Specialists' Views on the Distribution of Military
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Figure 4.5 "Orbital Structure of a Layered BMD System" [Ref. 97:p. 37]
Manned orbital labs can be "equipf>ed with instruments for carrying out the
basic space operations," which include "detection, discrimination, interception, and
destruction of enemy space objects." As General Anureyev wrote in 1971, "early
interception of [ballistic missiles] is viewed also by using antimissiles launched
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from a [manned] orbital station." [Ref. 41 :p. 198] Furthermore,
"
the use of laser
weapons is considered to be most probable on manned space interceptors and space
defense labs ." [Ref. 41:pp. 224,250 (emphasis added)] The Soviets also claim that
the U.S. space shuttle is designed to be used as a space platform for a laser weapon
[Ref. 98:pp. 30]--it is perhaps no accident that they are currently busy developing
their own shuttle [Ref. 19:p. 54].
As pointed out previously, the Soviets value the presence of a "man in the loop"
in the process of controlling weapons, especially aboard spacecraft. Manned
spacecraft enjoy significant advantages over unmanned satellites. According to the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia , "the presence of a crew on board assures the
solutions of complicated logical problems and making corresponding decisions."
[Ref. 99:p. 388] Furthermore, "a guided spacecraft with a crew can increase the
effectiveness of space reconnaissance, it can accurately identify a target and
distinguish a combat satellite from decoys , as well as simplify the execution of the
mission of hitting space and ground targets, reduce the probability of accidental
release of weapons , and so forth." [Ref. 41:pp. 65-66 (emphasis added)] Marshal
G.V. Zimin pointed out in 1976 that the presence of man in space "will significantly
simplify guidance in identifying and destroying the enemy's satellites or in
capturing them." [Ref. 100:p. 81] Manned space platforms would therefore appear
to play a unique and central role in any Soviet concept of advanced BMD or
antispace defense.
The Soviet concept of BMD therefore is clearly an integral component of
Soviet national air defense. BMD exists in close relationship with both antiaircraft
defense and antispace defense, and the systems and operations of all three overlap
and reinforce one another. In the Soviet mind, national air defense of the homeland
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encompasses protection against a continuum of threats--from hostile aircraft to
ballistic missiles to satellites and "space-strike weapons." As Marshal Zimin
observed in 1976:
The enormous destructive power of nuclear warheads raises the necessity of
destroying all targets without exception, which accomplished a breakthrough
into the interior of the country from air or space ... All of these conditions
put before the air defense complex and responsible tasks, the resolution of
which will be determined by the ability to repulse strikes not only of
aerodynamic, but also of ballistic means of attack. [Ref. 60:p. 172]
In the future, Soviet experts expect the antiaircraft, antimissile and antispace
defense missions to converge into a single integrated mission. In his assessment of
the future of national air defense, General Anureyev observed in 1971
:
. . . abroad it is felt that in the nuclear and space age, over the immediate
future, the basic tasks remain: detection, identification, interception, and
destruction. There is to be a further improvement in the weapons systems
and the methods of using them. In the more distant future, air and space
defenses will develop into a single global system of air and space defense. It,
in the opmion of foreign specialists, should provide defense against all types
of ballistic missiles (SRBM, IRBM, and LRBM) and aircraft, as well as
against orbital manned systems and manned spacecraft. [Ref. 41 :p. 113
(emphasis added)]
A comprehensive system of aerospace defense will greatly help to ensure the
attainment of Soviet wartime objectives. As Military' Strategy concludes, "without
the effective conduct of these operations, successful conduct of a modem war and
assurance of the normal vital activities of the country' are impossible." [Ref. 17:p.
285]
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V. THE OUTLOOK FOR SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE
A. SOVIET BMD AND ANTI-TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
it is clear from the discussion of Soviet BMD concepts in the previous chapter
that the Soviet military makes no great distinction between strategic and tactical
BMD, nor between strategic and tactical SAMs. The Soviets state quite openly that
antimissiles (i.e., surface-to-air missiles capable of shooting down ballistic missiles)
may be deployed at both BMD fire complexes and at traditional SAM sites.
Furthermore, antimissiles deployed at SAM sites may be used for defense against
both "operational-tactical" and "tactical" ballistic missiles as well as agaihst enemy
aircraft. These Soviet operational concepts are currently being realized with the
fielding of the SA-10 and SA-12 missile systems, which possess substantial
capabilities against a broad range of airborne targets.
The absence of a distinction between tactical and strategic air defense in Soviet
conceptualizations is quite significant. In contrast to the American tendency to
establish somewhat autonomous concepts of tactical and strategic weapons, Soviet
thinking reflects a much more integrated and much less compartmentalized concept
of defense against aerospace threats. The Soviets tend to perceive threats from the
air as a continuum: from aircraft and cruise missiles, to ballistic missiles (both
tactical and strategic), to weapons placed in orbit around the Earth. As General
Anureyev observes, "near space is viewed as a single sphere in which it is possible
to have flights of conventional aircraft, reusable manned spacecraft, artificial
satellites, and other objects." [Ref. 41 :p. 621
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In response to this spectrum of aerospace threats, the Soviets develop and
deploy weapons systems optimized to counter the total threat . In contrast, the
American approach has historically been to look at Soviet aerospace threats in
isolation from their overall operational context in order to develop a weapons
subsystem optimized to counter a particular Soviet weapon [Ref. 13:p. 31]. The
purpose of this comparison is not to argue that the Soviet method is necessarily
better than the American method, but to emphasize that it is different and should be
recognized as such in assessing capabilities of individual Soviet weapons, such as the
SA-10 and SA-12, as well as in future negotiations on arms limitations with the
Soviet Union.
Moreover, advances in sensor technology, data handling capabilities and
missile performance have done much and will continue to do much to obscure past
distinctions between strategic and tactical SAMs. According to Congressional
testimony by CIA officials, the SA-12's "technical capabilities bring to the
forefront the problem that improving technology is blurring the distinction
between air defense and ABM systems." [Ref. 101 :p. 5] This convergence in
capabilities has led some Western analysts to conclude that the new SA-10 and SA-
12 provide the U.S.S.R. with a significant BMD capability against tactical ballistic
missiles as well as an increasingly significant capability against strategic ballistic
missiles that is completely outside the control of the ABM Treaty [Ref. 2:p. 215].
The U.S. Department of Defense has assessed both the SA-10 and SA-12
systems as having the capability to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical
ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the SA-10 and SA-X-12B/GIANT "may have the
potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles." Over 80 SA-10
sites are currently operational in the Soviet Union and work is continuing on at
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least 20 others. The majority of these sites are located in the Moscow area, leading
the Defense Department to conclude that, "this emphasis on Moscow as well as the
deployment patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on
terminal defense of command-and-control, military, and key industrial
complexes." A new mobile version of the SA-10, designated the SA-lOb, "could be
used to support Soviet theater forces and to permit periodic changes in the location
of SA-10 sites within the USSR to counter the various kinds of U.S. retaliatory
forces more effectively." The SA-X-12B, under flight testing in 1987, is an
extremely capable, long range, high altitude mobile SAM that is expected to be
widely deployed throughout the Soviet Union. The SA-X-12B "could, if properly
supported, add a measure of point-target defense coverage for a nationwide ABM
deployment." [Ref. 19:pp. 60-61]
Because the ABM Treaty only specifically limits U.S. and Soviet capabilities
against "strategic" ballistic missiles, the deployment of the SA-10 and SA-12 for the
ATBM role is generally accepted by the U.S. as being within the Treaty's
restrictions. However, as T.K. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary' of Defense for
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, pointed out in 1983, "at the margin, a system
that has good capability against something like the Pershing II would also have
reasonable capability to defend reasonable areas against our ICBMs and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles." [Ref. 102:p. 242] Over both the near term and long
term, one can reasonably expect this trend towards ATBM (and even strategic
BMD) capabilities in Soviet air defense weapons to continue. As pointed out in
Chapter 2, the improvement of air defense weapons represents a distinct
development line for Soviet BMD hardware. In the meantime, the Soviets have
shown litde willingness to address U.S. concerns about the strategic role of SAMs
72
in arms control forums and, in fact, continue to maintain that none of their SAMs
has any ATBM or strategic BMD capability whatsoever. What will the continued
Soviet development and deployment of these strategic SAMs mean for Western
security?
According to Sa>Te Stevens, former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, the
development of Soviet SAMs capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles
represents "the most disturbing change in the balance of U.S. and Soviet strategic
defenses." [Ref. 2:pp. 214-215] The Soviet SA-10 and SA-12 could currently be
somewhat effective against older submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
such as the Poseidon and Trident I. whose reentr>' vehicles generally have a larger
radar cross section and whose reentr>' speeds are generally slower than ICBMs
[Ref. 2:p. 216]. As Stephen Weiner points out, "Since a long-range [tactical ballistic
missile] trajectory is virtually identical to a short-range SLBM trajectory, an
ATBM system would, almost by necessity, be capable of countering SLBMs." [Ref.
103:p. 73]
This capability against U.S. SLBMs is particularly significant in that SLBMs
represent the most survivable leg of the U.S. strategic triad. SLBMs constitute the
majority of U.S. nuclear warheads and while at sea are not subject to Soviet
counterforce strikes. In the absence of a comparable U.S. ability, a Soviet ability to
counter SLBMs which is not restrained by the ABM Treaty creates a serious and
widening strategic asymmetry. In the not too distant future, this asymmetry could
begin to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear retaliatory
capabilities, with serious consequences for the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic
balance.
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In the future, the Soviets may seek to develop and deploy ground-based laser
weapons for use in the ATBM/BMD role. The U.S. Department of Defense has
reported that the Soviets currently have ground-based lasers capable of attacking
U.S. satellites and could deploy a ground-based laser for air defense in the early
1990s. An operational ground-based laser weapon for BMD could follow in the
late 1990s. [Ref. 19:p. 51] In a 1985 article in Pravda. the Chief of the Soviet
General Staff appears to justify potential Soviet development and testing of ground-
based lasers. In citing Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty, Marshal
Akhromeyev asserts that "research, development and testing of ABM systems or
their components, based on other physical principles, is allowed in areas strictly
limited by the treaty and clearly defined by it, and only on (in connection with)
fixed ground-based ABM systems (as they are defined in Article 3 of the treaty)."
[Ref. 104:p. AA1-AA7] He goes on to say, however, that deployment of such a
weapon could occur only after reaching further agreements with the United States.
Nevertheless, public justification of the research, development and testing of
ground-based laser weapons by the Soviet Chief of the General Staff may suggest
that the Soviets are not ruling out replacing elements of the Moscow BMD system
with ground-based lasers at some point in the future [Ref. 9:p. 347].
B. SOVIET BMD AND THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE
Almost since the dawn of the space era, Soviet military literature has revealed a
profound appreciation for the potential role of space in future warfare. In 1962,
Military Strategy warned that space could become "the strategic theater of
tomorrow." [Ref. 17:p. 85] General Anureyev stated in 1971 that, "any war that
could start after 1975 without fail will be accompanied by military operations in
outer space and in near space." [Ref. 41 :p. 62] A 1980 article in Red Star , quoting
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the American press, stated in no uncertain terms that, "Whoever can seize control
of space — that main arena of future wars — will be able to change the correlation of
forces so decisively that it will be tantamount to establishing world supremacy."
[Ref. 105:p. 3]
Given this Soviet appreciation for the potential military role of space,
President Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on
March 23, 1983 must have come as a rather unwelcome surprise to the Soviet
leadership. Not only has SDI signaled a renewed U.S. interest in BMD, but also, in
the Soviet perception, a U.S. rejection of the current international strategic balance
and a desire to regain strategic superiority by establishing a war-winning posture
through the deployment of space-based weapons. In the words of Benjamin
Lambeth and Kevin Lewis, "Insofar as SDI aims ... to render nuclear weapons
'impotent and obsolete,' it threatens - at least from the Kremlin's vantage point -
to render worthless the very basis of the U.S.S.R.'s superpower status." [Ref.
106:p. vi] It should therefore come as no surprise to the U.S. that the Soviets, faced
with what they perceive as such a tremendous threat to their security, would
respond to SDI in a most aggressive manner. To date, this response has included
vigorous efforts to politically neutralize SDI through arms control and
propaganda. In the future, Soviet responses could include: an increase in offensive
arms (panicularly cruise missiles) not susceptible to space-based BMD systems;
countermeasures against directed energy weapons, such as fast-burning boosters,
spinning boosters, and space mines or ASATs to cripple space-based weapons
platforms; and the accelerated deployment of further terminal BMD weapons [Ref.
107].
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But what is the likelihood of an "emulatory" Soviet response to SDI? It is clear
from the discussion of Soviet BMD and antispace defense concepts in Chapter 4 that
the Soviet open literature has historically revealed some skepticism regarding the
effectiveness of space-based BMD. Nevertheless, because of the advantageous
intercept geometry, BMD systems in space could destroy ICBMs in the boost and
post-boost phases, prior to the separation of RVs and penetration aids. Intercepting
ICBMs early in their flight could thus bring great strategic leverage, especially
against a MIRVed ICBM threat. Would the U.S.S.R. therefore respond in kind to a
U.S. deployment of BMD weapons in space? The Soviet literature is especially
mute on the subject of Soviet weapons in space. However, Stephen Meyer
postulates that:
. . . there are indications from past behaviour and contemporary statements
which suggest that Soviet military and political leaders do not see SDI as
simply another military challenge or another spiral in the continuing nuclear
arms competition where off-setting measures would suffice. Rather, SDI is
seen as a profound technological challenge: the initiation of 'a new type of
arms race', one involving 'previously unknown new types of weapons based
on new physical principles.' This technological challenge, Soviet political
and military leaders have repeatedly observed, is one which the Soviet Union
cannot afford to ignore. In other words, an off-setting response to SDI is not
sufficient: an emulating response is required as well. [Ref. 57:p. 275]
Most analysts agree that future Soviet initiatives in BMD weapons would stress
ground-based, and not space-based, components. [Ref. 106:pp. 88-89, Ref. 108:p.
46] However, as we have seen, the Soviets are acutely aware of the importance of
the new "high ground" of space in a future conflict with the West. According to
John Hines and George Kraus, the Soviet leadership is "necessarily convinced that
in the long term the continued struggle for military domination of space is a
historical inevitability." [Ref. 13:p. 28] Yet any Soviet response to SDI involving
space-based weaponry would of necessity be constrained by three major factors -
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technology, economics and Soviet military thinking. Therefore, any future Soviet
space-based BMD system would most likely be a uniquely Soviet response,
necessarily bearing little or no resemblance to an analogous U.S. system.
1. Soviet Technology for RMD
In certain key areas for space-based BMD, Soviet technology is perhaps
equal to or ahead of U.S. technology, particularly with respect to direct
applications. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S.S.R. began its
comprehensive research program into advanced BMD technologies in the late
1960s. Since then, directed energy physics has been an area of notable Soviet
achievement. The Soviet laser program is estimated to be "considerably larger
than U.S. efforts and involves over 10,000 scientists and engineers as well as more
than a half-dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges." [Ref.
19:p. 50] According to one Western expert, "There are practically no areas of laser
technology where the USSR has not either been at the forefront of developments, or
even leading the way." [Ref. 109:p. 77] The Defense Department estimates that the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. currently enjoy approximate overall equality in directed energy
technology [Ref. 4:p. 245].
The Soviet laser weapons program, for which much of the research takes
place at the Sar) Shagan Missile Test Center, includes research in gas-dynamic,
electric discharge and chemical lasers. Additionally, the Soviets are exploring the
military potential of excimer, free-electron, x-ray and argon-ion lasers. This
extensive research effort has given the Soviets the potential to deploy a high-energy
laser weapon for troop air defense in the early 1990s and for naval air defense in
the mid-1990s. Current Soviet ground-based lasers possess "some capability" to
attack U.S. satellites and deployment of a prototype space-based laser weapon for
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antispace defense is projected for before the end of the decade. Furthermore, the
Soviets could possibly deploy an operational ground-based laser for BMD as early
as the late 1990s and a space-based BMD laser weapon sometime "after the year
2000." [Ref.l9:pp. 50-51]
Particle beam and radio-frequency (RF) weapons are other promising
areas of Soviet directed energy weapons research. It is estimated that the Soviet
Union has "extensive programs (in progress over the past ten years and more) for
the development of charged particle beam weapons, which greatly exceed the
programs of the U.S.A. in both scope and state of development." [Ref. 109:p. 70]
The Department of Defense concludes that the Soviets "may be able to test a
prototype space-based particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of
satellites in the 1990s." The development of an effective panicle beam weapon for
BMD, however, would take significantly longer. The Soviets have also conducted
research in high power RF signal generators which potentially have both BMD and
antispace applications. They could conceivably test a ground-based RF weapon for
antispace defense sometime in the 1990s. [Ref. 19:p. 51]
The Soviets also have extensive research programs underway in kinetic
energy weapons. They have demonstrated an experimental kinetic accelerator
capable of accelerating small particles to velocities approaching 25 kilometers per
second within the atmosphere and 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum. In the
near future, they could possibly deploy a short-range kinetic energy weapon in
space for space station defense or antisatellite attacks. A long-range kinetic energy
weapon forBMD could possibly be developed in the mid-1990s. [Ref. 19:p. 51]
The Soviets currently enjoy significant advantages over the U.S. in space
transportation capabilities. They maintain a large inventory of space launch
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vehicles (SLVs), including eight operational boosters and the new heavy lift SL-X-
17 "Energiya" which will be able to place payloads of 100,000 kilograms into low
Earth orbit. ^"^ The SL-X-17 will be the launch vehicle for the new Soviet space
shuttle, which is expected to make its maiden flight sometime in 1988. The Soviets
are also developing a small, manned space plane, a subscale version of which has
already been flight tested in orbit. This space plane could be used for "quick-
reaction, real-time reconnaissance missions, satellite repairs and maintenance, crew
transport, space station defense, satellite inspection and, if necessary, satellite
negation." With this robust inventory of reliable SLVs, the Soviets routinely
conduct about 100 launches per year. Many of these launches are required because
of the shorter operational lifetimes of Soviet spacecraft. However, the capability to
quickly launch a wide range of boosters with various payloads could give the
U.S.S.R. a distinct advantage in rapidly augmenting or replacing space systems
during a crisis. [Ref. 110:pp. 6-14J
The Soviets can also boast a significant advantage over the United States in
manned space operations. Manned space operations occupy a central position in the
Soviet space program. The Soviets have adeptly used manned space missions for
political purposes, recently hosting foreign cosmonauts aboard the new "Mir"
space station. Additionally, Mir cosmonauts conduct experiments in remote
sensing, oceanography, meteorology and other scientific disciplines. The Soviets
have maintained a permanent manned presence aboard Mir since February 1987
and cosmonaut Yuri Romanenko recently set a new space endurance record after
i"* By comparison, the U.S. Space Shuttle can put a maximum of 26,000
kilograms into lov>' Earth orbit (approximately 185 kilometers altitude).
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326 days in space. The Soviets are also well aware of the military utility of a
manned system in orbit. As noted in Chapter 4, manned space systems are central
to Soviet thinking about space warfare and antispace defense.
In certain other technologies critical to a space-based BMD system,
however, the Soviet Union is at a distinct disadvantage. According to the Office of
Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, "The United States clearly remains
ahead of the Soviet Union in key areas required for advanced BMD systems,
including sensors, signal processing, optics, microelectronics, computers and
software." [Ref. 1 ll:pp. 11-12] Soviet efforts to catch up with the United States in
these areas will involve substantial modernization of the Soviet economy.
2. Soviet Economic Constraints
Soviet leaders have accused the United States of wanting to use SDI to
"exhaust the Soviet Union economically". [Ref. 112:p. A12] After more than
twenty years of sustained force modernization, the Soviet leadership is finally
having to confront real limits to continued military growth, owing to the serious
structural problems in the Soviet economy. The problems of declining
productivity, low capital investment, shortages in energy and raw materials,
transportation bottlenecks and the slow integration of modem technology into the
Soviet system have continued to grow since the mid-1970s. [Ref. 106:pp. 74-75]
In order to solve these problems. General Secretary Gorbachev has called
for greater emphasis on the Soviet machine-building industry, particularly those
sectors concerned with electronic engineering, machine tools, computers and
instrumentation. However, any major Soviet effort to develop and deploy an
"emulatory" space-based BMD system using Soviet "high technology" could face
significant competition for resources from the civilian sector as well as from other
programs within the military. [Ref. 106:pp. 74-751
This potential for resource competition goes to the heart of what some
Western observers suspect to be an internal Soviet debate about the pace at which
emerging military technologies should be pursued. According to David Yost, "The
Soviets have, it appears, been debating for several years the pace at which they
should attempt to introduce new non-nuclear weapons such as long-range high-
accuracy delivery systems" as well as how to prepare for the introduction of
weapons based on new physical principles. While there is probably little
disagreement in the Soviet Union about the ultimate desirability of developing these
new technologies, there may be some significant differences about the immediate
military tradeoffs to be made in carrying their development forward. "The
ultimate choice" for the Soviets may be "between (a) spending more now for
greater military power in the near term and (b) re-capitalizing the industrial sector
to be able to develop military' power more effectively in the future." [Ref. 9:p. 326]
3. Thg ipHugPCg 9f ?>9vigt Military Sckncg
If the Soviets were to deploy a space-based BMD system in the near future,
its character and scope would be strongly influenced not only by the available
technology and the economic assets committed, but also by the Soviet operational
concepts of BMD as worked out by Soviet military science. These concepts, as
shown in Chapter 4, place great emphasis on the potential wartime role of manned
space platforms. It can be expected, therefore, that any Soviet BMD systems
deployed in space would, at least initially, involve manned spacecraft.
Manned space systems would overcome many of the Soviet technological
disadvantages outlined above. A manned BMD battle station would not require the
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sophisticated sensors, optics and automation that an unmanned station would, nor
would it necessarily require the high mechanical reliability and extended on-orbit
lifetimes of a network of autonomous spacecraft. More significantly, in the Soviet
view, a space-based BMD system using manned spacecraft would not need to be
totally leak-proof to be effective. As we have seen, Soviet strategic defenses
confront a potential adversary with a broad range of obstacles to a successful
strategic attack - BMD, air defense, civil defense, mobile ICBMs, etc. - and rely
on the synergistic effects achieved by combining these partially effective
components into a much more effective whole. The current Soviet lead in manned
space operations and space transportation capabilities would allow the U.S.S.R.,
should it so choose, to rapidly deploy a space-based BMD weapon of some
effectiveness using existing spacecraft, such as the Salyut and Mir.
As General Anureyev observed in 1971, "the use of laser weapons is
considered to be most probable on manned space interceptors and space defense
labs." [Ref. 41 :p. 250] More recently, in addresssing the issue of space-based BMD
weapons research and development, Roald Sagdeyev, a prominent member of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, stated that "some tests could be carried out in
space," because "we scientists consider manned space stations as orbital
laboratories." [Ref. 113:p. A4] The Mir space station would be particularly suited
for rapid expansion into a space-based laser weapons platform. The Mir core
vehicle itself is basically a habitation and flight control center equipped with six
docking ports — one rear axial port, one forward axial port and four forward
lateral ports (see Figure 5.1). These docking ports can accommodate special space
station modules, such as the "Kvant" astrophysics module. In the future, special
reconnaissance or weapons modules could also be attached. As pointed out by the
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Defense Depanment, some of the current cosmonaut activities aboard Mir have
potential laser weapons application. For example, precise astronomical
obser\'ations "can develop techniques useful for maintaining the orientation of
certain equipment to an accuracy of a few arc-seconds, a capability needed to aim
directed-energy weapyons." [Ref. 110:p. 9] Furthermore:
The Soviets have reported that their cosmonauts have used visual
observations, cameras, spectrometers, and multispectral electro-optical
sensors in their observations from SALYUT and MIR space stations. These
experiments suggest the Soviets are evaluating their abihty to locate, identify,
and track targets from outer space. This could be the first step toward
designing a space weapons platform for use against targets in space and on
Earth. Such a platform may eventually be used for ASAT and ballistic
missile defense operations as well as for space station defense. [Ref. 1 10:p. 9]
Figure 5.1 The Soviet MIR Space Stauon [Ref. llU:p. lOJ
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Soviet deployment of a space-based laser weapon for BMD would, of
course, be a flagrant violation of the ABM Treaty. Such a clear-cut Soviet decision
to "breakout" of the ABM Treaty could unleash a determined U.S. effort to
overcome such a system; for this reason, such a breakout is considered by most
Western analysts to be highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, the
capability to deploy such a weapon relatively quickly at a time of their choosing
would give the Soviet military leadership a unique treaty "breakout" potential. The
question of future Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty, as well as both the
significant benefits and constraints the treaty regime has placed on the Soviet BMD
program, is the subject of the following section.
C. SOVIET BMD AND THE FUTURE OF THE ABM TREATY
All in all, the ABM Treaty has done litde to prevent the Soviet Union from
developing the potential to rapidly deploy a nationwide BMD system. At the same
time it has historically done much to delay and even halt BMD programs in the
United States, such as the SAM-D program in the 1970s. With the current Soviet
lead in deployed and readily-deployable BMD systems, one might wonder if at
some point the Soviets may no longer find adherence to the ABM Treaty to be in
their best interests. In fact, the treaty allows either side to withdraw with six
months' notice in the event that its "supreme interests" have been jeopardized.
Would the Soviets find it in their "supreme interests" in the near future to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty?
Near term "breakout" of the ABM Treaty would certainly bring the Soviet
leadership short term strategic gains. Perhaps the most important of these would be
a sudden shift in the strategic balance which would weaken the credibility of
Western deterrents and bring the Soviet Union great strategic and political
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leverage. As the Soviets must indeed recognize, however, these gains would
probably provoke a determined Western response and would probably, therefore,
in the long run be counter-productive.
As we have seen, one of the primary objectives of Soviet military doctrine is
maintaining a damage-limiting preemptive capability. The ABM Treaty has
proven over the years to be a most effective instrument for ensuring this capability.
As the Soviets admit, arms control negotiations are an integral part of their military
strategy [Ref. 63 :p. 5] Soviet abrogation of the treaty would remove its constraints
on active Western BMD defenses and probably bring about the accelerated
development of both offensive and defensive capabilities in the West. As William
Odom obser\'es:
The deployment of active defenses for NATO, in the Soviet planner's mind,
would presage many other things. First, it would be seen as the beginning of
defense improvements that would lead to others, more effective, more
troublesome. Second, it would reflect a different Western psychological
attitude to modern warfare. The concept of mutual vulnerability, upon
which Soviet negotiatiors and planners have traded without accepting for
their own planning, could no longer be expected to constrain Western force
development. That would be a dramatic change for both political and
militan,' leaders in the Soviet Union. [Ref. 114:p. 173]
It would seem then that the same factors are influencing the Soviet decision on
ABM Treat}' abrogation as influenced their decision to approve the ABM Treaty in
the first place. The Soviets probably still desire to keep a rein on U.S. BMD
programs in order to maintain their ability to carry out damage-limiting
preemptive strikes. In fact, the Soviets will probably be content to maintain the
ABM Treaty regime for the foreseeable future, not only because of the cap it puts
on U.S. BMD programs, but also because of their success in strengthening then-
own BxMD potential while generally staying within the treaty's restrictions.
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Therefore, despite the impressive Soviet breakout potential, "a clear-cut decision
for breakout seems improbable in normal peacetime conditions. "^5 [Ref. 9:p. 314]
What is of greater concern than breakout, however, is what many analysts have
termed "creepout." "Creepout" refers to the gradual circumvention of treaty
responsibilities through incremental or ambiguous treaty violations and technology
advances in systems otherwise permitted by the treaty. In this context, the
Krasnoyarsk radar, the development of transportable system components and the
testing of SAM components in an ABM mode (all identified by the U.S. government
as outright or probable violations of the ABM Treaty), can be seen as part of an
apparent Soviet effort to "creepout" of its ABM Treaty obligations. David Yost has
concluded that, "Soviet policy has been calculated to develop as much 'breakout'
potential as possible and perhaps even to 'creepout' to some extent (via SAM
upgrades, among other activities) so long as this may be done without provoking
the U.S. and its allies into a vigorous BMD competition and/or the pursuit of
substantial offensive force countermeasures. The Soviets may see it as a sensible
objective to enhance their lead over the United States in promptly exploitable BMD
capabilities without endangering U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty by
engaging in violations or ambiguous activities that the U.S. would find intolerable."
[Ref. 9:p. 322] William Odom has added that "creepout is probably a much greater
threat on the Soviet side than breakout from the ABM Treaty." [Ref. 1 14:p. 164]
Another major factor which may influence future Soviet BMD developments is
the U.S. SDI program. Moscow's response to U.S. BMD deployments will hold
^5 On the other hand, if the Soviets thought war were imminent, a breakout
and rapid deployment of BMD weapons could greatly improve the survivability of
critical Soviet leadership and control facilities.
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great risks and challenges for U.S. policy makers. Restrictions on SDI will
undoubtedly be linked to any major arms control concessions the Soviets may offer.
Should Soviet arms control efforts fail to stop the development of a U.S. space-
based BMD system, a proliferation of Soviet offensive arms, including non-
ballistic weapons, countermeasures against directed energy and kinetic energy
weapons, and the rapid deployment of ground-based terminal BMD weapons can be
expected. According to Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev, "[The
Soviet Union] is left with no choice: it will be forced to ensure the restoration of
the strategic balance, and to build up its own strategic offensive forces,
supplementing them with means of defense." [Ref. 1 15:p. 40]
In the long run, however, the SDI program represents a basic shift in the long-
term nature of militar>' competition with the West which the Soviets would prefer
to avoid or at least delay. While current Soviet assessments of the East-West
correlation of forces seem to be somewhat optimistic, long term forecasts of the
military balance beyond the mid-1990s are much more pessimistic about the Soviet
Union's ability to compete with the West. [Ref. 26:p. 24] This pessimism stems not
only from Soviet concern about the U.S.S.R.'s economic stagnation and
unfavorable demographic trends, but also from a belief that "a new qualitative leap
in the development of military affairs in general is imminent.";
In particular, the Soviet military seems to fear that the nature of military
competition between the Soviet Union and the West is rapidly shifting to an
increasing emphasis on the qualitative dimension. The Soviets have
recognized Western effons to bring about such a shift for at least 10 years or
longer, but it has only been with the recent acceleration of the pace of the
scientific-technical revolution that the Soviets have become concerned that
the West might achieve this goal. [Ref. 26:pp. 24-25]
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Once again the ABM Treaty could serve the Soviet Union as an effective
instrument for hindering U.S. efforts to capitalize on American technological
advantages while ensuring a viable Soviet counter-force capability. Concurrently
the Soviets could continue to develop their own science and technology ~ on the one
hand, strengthening their capabilities in areas in which they enjoy an advantage,
such as manned space systems and space launch assets, while on the other hand,
attempting to avoid being left behind in the fields of signal processing, optics,
microelectronics and computer technology -- all critical to a boost-phase BMD
system and, in their view, to future warfare in general.
The Soviets would therefore probably prefer to maintain the ABM Treaty in its
current form as a constraint on U.S. BMD advances, or even to strengthen it with
additional constraints on so-called "space-strike weapons." Recent Soviet arms
control initiatives, such as the draft treaty submitted to the United Nations in
August 1983, seek to prohibit the deployment of space-based weapons regardless of
the location of their targets (i.e., targets in space, in the atmosphere or on the
earth's surface) and to outlaw all antisatellite weapons, interference with other
nations' satellites, and space-based systems used "in any other manner as means to
destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space." [Ref. 5:pp.
53-55] Soviet concern about "space-strike weapons" has certainly intensified since
the Marsh 1983 initiation of SDI, yet this Soviet concern predates SDI itself and
encompasses what the Soviets now consider a central element of future theater
warfare - the "reconnaissance-strike complex." A reconnaissance-strike complex
will link space-based sensors and fire systems in real time to execute strike missions
throughout the depths of an enemy's defenses [Ref. 45 :p. 35] In Soviet eyes, SDI is
particularly worrisome, not only as a potentially effective BMD system, but also
because of the possible technological breakthroughs SDI research will foster in the
fields of sensors, information processing and directed energy weapons, all of which
may have direct application to future theater warfare.
Furthermore, Soviet arms control proposals to ban "space-strike weapons"
have been carefully ambiguous in areas of potential Soviet advantage. According
to an analysis by Steven Haas and Scott Bennett, Soviet proposals are worded so as
to limit restrictions on weapons not specifically banned by the ABM Treaty. For
example, according to the aforementioned 1983 Soviet draft treaty, ground-based
BMD weapons, including ground-based laser BMD weapons, in which the Soviets
have invested great time and effort, would not be restricted.(Ref 116: Appendix D)
The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated that the Soviets could field
prototype ground-based laser weapons for BMD "by the late 1980s and could begin
testing components for a large-scale deployment system in the early 1990s." [Ref.
19:p. 51] As Haas and Bennett point out:
However, if the Soviets propose less than a complete ban on ground-based
weapons utilizing new technologies to attack incoming RVs, then they open
the question of [using] such weapons to attack satellites. An ABM system
utilizing ground-based lasers may be equally, perhaps even more, effective
against orbiting satellites. Also, the treatment of direct-ascent weapons with
the potential for dual capabilities to attack both satellites and incoming RVs
would be uncertain. [Ref. 116]
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the Soviets believe that "the destruction of the
[ballistic] missile on the middle leg of the trajectory is possible approximately with
the same principles as the interception of the satellite in orbit with the missile
defense weapons." [Ref 42:p. 65] Therefore, in both the currently deployed
GALOSH interceptor and in future ground-based laser weapons, the Soviets
effectively have both a BMD interceptor and an antisatellite weapon. Perhaps not
surprisingly, Soviet proposals to limit "space-strike weapons" in no way appear
designed to effect deployment of these weapons.
In summary, while in the mid-1970s the United States decided against BMD
deployments of any type under the ABM Treaty regime, the Soviets have been able
to build and modernize a BMD system of some effectiveness for preferential
defense of critical leadership and military targets against small or third-party
attacks. At the same time they have postured themselves for a rapid breakout from
the treaty constraints, should the need arise, by gradually creeping out of the treaty
through SAM upgrades, LPAR deployments, etc. This great asymmetry in BMD
posture, combined with even greater asymmetries in air defenses and passive
defenses, has been much to the Soviet Union's advantage over the last two decades.
With the current renewed U.S. commitment to BMD, it remains to be seen whether
this strategic asymmetry will survive.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Soviet thinking on defense against ballistic missile attack is fundamentally
different from that in the West. According to Soviet military doctrine, strategic
defense against an enemy's nuclear attack would be one of the major strategic actions
of the Soviet armed forces in a future war. Strategic air defense of the Soviet Union,
particularly BMD, would therefore play a crucial role in the overall Soviet
warfighting effort. As one leading Soviet militar>' writer explained in 1976, "now
victor}' or defeat in v.'ar has become dependent on how much the state is in a position
to reliably defend the important objects on its territor>' from the destruction of strikes
from air or space." [Ref. 60:p. 127]
Since achieving nuclear parity with the West, the Soviets have never resigned
themselves to the .American concept of "mutual assured destruction", but instead
have attempted to arm themselves for conducting and sur\'iving a nuclear war. A key
element in Soviet nuclear warfighting strategy is damage limitation. One of the major
operating principles of this Soviet strategy is the necessity for preempting an enemy's
nuclear attack in order to limit damage to the Soviet Union itself. Another major
principle of this strategy is active and passive defenses against an enemy's strategic
attack. Therefore, for the Soviets to prevail in the event of war, while at the same
time preserving the Soviet Union as a viable society and the enhancing its prospects
for emerging as the dominant power in the post-war world, strategic defense against
ballistic missile attack has become essential.
Within the context of this preemptive strategy, the primary role of Soviet
strategic defenses might therefore be to limit damage caused by "the forces remaining
to the United States after a preemptive strike." In fact, "such a mission could
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significantly reduce the technical requirements put upon a BMD system. BMD does
not have to carry the brunt of thwarting an enemy attack." [Ref. 2:p. 187] Even an
imperfect Soviet BMD system, such as exists today, could therefore play a critical
role in ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union as a political system, a functioning
society and a post-war military power. In addition, such an imperfect system could
be particularly effective against a limited strategic attack.
In the Soviet view, strategic offense and strategic defense exist in a close
synergistic relationship. Soviet strategic defense efforts occur not in opposition to
strategic offense, but in parallel with the Soviet requirement for maintaining, if
possible, overwhelming militar}' capabilities in relation to the U.S.S.R.'s likely
adversaries in war. As one prominent Soviet expert on BMD wrote in .1967, "a
sharp change in the correlation of forces to one's own advantage can be achieved by
means of the mass application of nuclear weapons with the simultaneous repulsing of
a sudden attack by the air-space means of the enemy ." [Ref. 52:p. 164 (emphasis
added)] The fundamental connection in Soviet thinking between offense and defense
has profound implications for Soviet weapons acquisition strategies and force
structure. The Soviets recognize the inevitable and often "revolutionary"
advancement of military technology and believe that "the side which first creates an
antimissile (antispace) defense will have a most important strategic advantage which
would allow the threatening of war or its unleashing without fear of the enemy's
retaliatory strikes ." [Ref 17:p. 91 (emphasis added)] Continued advances in BMD
technology, as part of what they perceive to be the historical dialectic of offense and
defense, are to be expected and exploited. Furthermore, the Soviets would appear to
be extremely unlikely to forego research and development in strategic defenses
merely because of the current predominance of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.
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Despite the limitations imposed by the ABM Treaty on BMD deployments, ballistic
missile defenses will in all likelihood continue to play a crucial role in Soviet military
strategy.
According to the Soviet literature, BMD is an integral component of their overall
national air defense effort, closely coordinated with traditional antiaircraft defense as
well antispace defense. In the Soviet mind, national air defense encompasses
protection against a continuum of threats -- from hostile aircraft to balhstic missiles to
satellites and "space-strike weapons." In the Soviet military, BMD forces probably
include dedicated men and equipment whose primary purpose is the destruction of
enemy ballistic missiles, both what we in the West call "strategic" ballistic missiles
and "tactical" ballistic missiles. Soviet BMD forces are probably under the
operational control of the Soviet General Staff, which directs their employment
through the main staff of the V-PVO. Currently the primar>' Soviet BMD weapon is
the ground-launched "antimissile", such as the GALOSH. However, electronic
countermeasures and, in the future, directed energy and kinetic energy weapons may
also play a major role in countering an enemy ballistic missile attack. According to
some Soviet authors, naval forces could also play a role in a national BMD system.
[Ref. 41:pp. 191-192]
It is imponant to note that, according to the Soviet military literature, current
ground-based BMD weapons may be deployed at both "BMD fire complexes" and at
conventional SAM sites. [Ref. 75 :p. 598] BMD weapons deployed at SAM sites are
truly dual-purpose weapons, able to be used against ballistic missiles (both tactical
and intermediate range) as well as against aircraft. This Soviet operational concept is
currently being realized with the fielding of the SA-10 and SA-12 missile systems,
which possess substantial capabilities against a broad range of airborne targets and
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might currently be somewhat effective against certain types of U.S. strategic missiles
[Ref. 19:p. 61]. In the absence of a comparable U.S. ability, a Soviet ability to
counter strategic missiles that is not restrained by the ABM Treaty creates a serious
and widening strategic asymmetry. In the not too distant future, this asymmetry
could begin to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear retaliatory
capabilities, with serious consequences for the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.
Furthermore, the Soviets consider BMD antimissiles to be one of their primary
weapons for destroying enemy satellites. [Ref. 83 :p. 596] This point is significant in
that the Soviet GALOSH antimissile has been operationally deployed since the late
1960s, giving the Soviets both a limited BMD capability and an operational ASAT
for the last twenty years. This capability has been enhanced with the deployment of
the improved GALOSH.
Manned space platforms have played a particularly important role in Soviet
conceptualizations of space warfare and BMD, as well as in Soviet thinking about the
future of armed conflict in general. The Soviets feel that "a manned space lab is one
of the basic means for conquering space for military purposes ." [Ref. 41 :p. 96]
Furthermore, according to the Soviet literature, " the use of laser weapons is
considered to be most probable on manned space interceptors and space defense
labs ." [Ref. 41 :p. 250] Manned space systems could overcome many of the Soviet
technological disadvantages in areas crucial to a space-based BMD system. In fact,
the Soviet "Mir" space station could be particularly suited for rapid expansion into a
space-based BMD weapons platform through the attachment of special
reconnaissance or weapons modules.
As the Soviet literature clearly shows, Soviet thinking on defense against ballistic
missile attack is fundamentally different from that in the West. In order to more fully
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understand Soviet intentions, therefore, both in BNID weapons programs and in arms
control negotiations with the West, it is essential to accurately understand the larger
context of Soviet thinking on the role of BMD in a future war. Analysis of open-
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